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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to link the concepts of globalization and wage inequality, while 
comparing the different realities of developed and developing countries where this issue 
is concerned, and it includes a special focus, in the empirical portion, on the European 
Union. The goals are, first, to review the available theoretical and empirical literature, 
and then to test the foremost theoretical mechanisms by building and testing a panel 
data model on two samples of European Union countries (EU), one taking the place of 
the North and the other taking the place of the South, as they are defined in the 
mechanisms under scrutiny. 
We found that trade has the effect of enhancing inequality in the “North” countries of 
our EU sample (confirming the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson mechanism), though we 
could not significantly conclude on its effect in the “South”. Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) Inflows have the effect of diminishing inequality in the “North”, while FDI 
outflows have the same effect in the “South”. These results are not predicted in 
Feenstra-Hanson theory. We also tested the effect of technology on inequality through 
two variables and, while we found mixed evidence for how the share of High Tech 
Exports affects inequality (we found both positive and negative coefficients for the 
“North” sample, the variable was not significant for the “South” sample), Gross 
Expenditure on Research and Development was, when significant, always positive for 
the “North” sample. By testing with a composite globalization index, we conclude that 
trade is dominant over FDI when it comes to which economic flow affects inequality 
with more force. Moreover, when we tested for the non-economic aspects of 
globalization, we found that both political and social aspects of it cause wage inequality 
to increase. 
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Resumo 
Com esta dissertação, pretendemos explorar a relação entre a globalização e a 
desigualdade salarial, com um enfoque, na parte empírica, na União Europeia. 
Começámos por rever as principais teorias existentes sobre este tema, os principais 
mecanismos através dos quais a globalização afeta a desigualdade salarial dentro dos 
países, especificamente o papel do Comércio Internacional, do Investimento Direto 
Estrangeiro e da Tecnologia. Em seguida, revimos a literatura empírica sobre este 
assunto, tentando perceber se as teorias são confirmadas ou não pelos estudos já 
efetuados. 
A nossa secção empírica consiste no estudo da União Europeia, dividida em dois 
grupos, fazendo o papel do “Norte” e “Sul” em que se baseiam as teorias que 
estudámos. 
Concluímos que o comércio internacional aumenta a desigualdade no países do “Norte” 
da nossa amostra (confirmando a teoria de Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson), sendo que não 
conseguimos concluir sobre o seu efeito no “Sul”. Os inflows de Investimento Direto 
Estrangeiro (IDE) fazem com que a desigualdade diminua no “Norte”, enquanto os 
outflows de IDE têm o mesmo efeito no “Sul”. Estes resultados não estão previstos na 
teoria de Feenstra-Hanson. Testámos o efeito da tecnologia na desigualdade, utilizando 
duas variáveis. Encontrámos resultados mistos para a primeira, a Percentagem de 
Exportações de Alta Tecnologia sobre o PIB (só sendo significativa para o “Norte”, 
encontrámos tanto coeficientes positivos como negativos), mas o efeito da Despesa em 
Investigação em Desenvolvimento tem, consistentemente, um coeficiente positivo para 
a amostra “Norte”. Testando o efeito de índice composto de globalização, concluímos 
que, no que toca aos fluxos económicos da globalização, o comércio tem um efeito mais 
pronunciado do que o IDE. Finalmente, quando testámos os aspetos não económicos da 
globalização, concluímos que, tanto os aspetos sociais, como os políticos, contribuem 
para o aumento da desigualdade. 
Palavras-chave: desigualdade salarial; globalização; países em desenvolvimento; 
Europa; dados em painel. 
Códigos JEL: C23; F15; F63; O15. 
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1. Introduction 
The now well-established, rather comprehensive, concept of globalization is arguably 
the best word to characterize cross-border integration in International Economics 
literature. The growing interconnectedness of economies all over the world, especially 
in terms of trade and investment, but also in terms of social and political dimensions, 
has an impact on the lives of nearly every person. 
Therefore, it is natural that “[t]he pros and cons of globalization are vividly debated, and 
the labor market consequences are among the most persistent concerns.” (Andersen and 
Sørensen, 2011; p. 595). In a world philosophy that purports to be global, it is hardly 
acceptable for some layers of the population not to be included as beneficiaries.  
 Globalization can be measured and defined in a myriad of different ways, from rising 
trade openness and higher levels of foreign direct investment flows to indices covering 
other economic, political and social dimensions. Examples of the latter include the 
Maastricht Globalization Index (MGI), Economic Freedom of the World Project 
(EFW), the Kearney Globalization Index (KGI) and the KOF Index.  
Meanwhile, wage differences within a country are a crucial determinant of overall 
income equality. The wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, in particular, is 
widely used in economic literature for assessing inequality. Several proxies can be used 
to assess this variable. Some examples are the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers, the proportion of low-wage earners, the high-low decile or quartile ratios or 
indices of wage dispersion like the Theil index. 
Given that “[t]here has been an upsurge in income and wage inequalities” in “advanced 
countries since the late 1970s” (Chusseau et al., 2008; p. 411), there is a natural interest 
in studying these two phenomena and in trying to determine whether the two are 
connected. It is this relationship we intend to study in this work.  
Theoretical economic literature has indeed been concerned with this relation for quite 
some time. Given the complex nature of globalization and of the mechanisms it sets off, 
however, there is not just one straightforward answer to this general question of how it 
affects inequality. The aspects of globalization are varied and the ways through which 
they work even more so. Therefore, there are several different mechanisms linking 
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different characteristics of our ever-more-open economic reality to the income 
inequality that is felt throughout the world. 
One reference framework for this study is the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem, 
which states that increasing trade between developed and developing countries causes 
wage inequality to increase in developed countries and to decrease in developing 
countries. Another important theoretical framework is the Feenstra-Hanson theorem 
which focuses on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), another characteristic of a global 
economy, and that concludes that FDI inflows from developed to developing countries 
cause increases in wage inequality in both sets of countries. Several other mechanisms 
operate within the economic dimension and in other dimensions of globalization to 
affect inequality.  
One of the goals of this dissertation is to review the available literature on this subject – 
theoretical and empirical – and to assess whether the two are concordant: are the 
mechanisms predicted in economic theory truly observed to be in effect when applied to 
real economies and situations? Moreover, we intend to contribute with an empirical 
analysis to the study of this phenomenon in the context of the European Union (EU) and 
to spark a debate as to the differences in the effect of globalization on two sets of 
countries, since some of the mechanisms predict different results in developed and 
developing countries. 
Therefore, Chapter 2 of this dissertation will focus on literature review, both theoretical 
and empirical. The theoretical section will specify the concepts, as well as describe the 
theoretical mechanisms linking globalization and inequality (and other mechanisms that 
are considered relevant to inequality, even if they are only indirectly attributable to 
globalization). The empirical section seeks to compile previous studies and to sum up 
their conclusions, regarding the validation of the mechanisms in question. Chapter 3 
will describe the methodology of the empirical portion of this dissertation, detailing the 
model we are going to use, dependent and independent variables, sources of data, as 
well as the temporal and spatial scope of this study. Chapter 4 will present the results 
reached in the empirical study, starting with a descriptive analysis of inequality in these 
countries, then moving on to test each mechanism separately. Chapter 5 presents the 
concluding remarks.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The concepts 
The main concepts involved in this study are those of Globalization and Wage 
Inequality. While, for the former, we expect to capture its broad definition, regarding 
the latter, we want specifically to focus on wage dispersion measures (and not on those 
related to wealth or disposable income).  
 
2.1.1 Globalization 
Generally speaking, and as explained by Krugman et al. (2011), what we think of as 
globalization today started with the growth of international trade which followed the 
Industrial Revolution, in the 19th century. This interconnectedness was severely 
hampered by the two World Wars which occurred in the 20th century and it is only after 
the Second World War ended in 1945 that what economists call the “second wave of 
globalization”, which we are still in, began. It is this era of globalization that has been 
studied the most by economists and it is also the one we are concerned with here. 
Globalization is not an easily-defined concept, as it includes economic, social and 
political aspects, all of which are crucial and have impacts on wage determination. 
The political dimension is well-illustrated by institutions like the United Nations and the 
European Union (EU), examples of a world increasingly interested in working and 
finding solutions together. For instance, in the context of the Eurozone, member-states 
cannot make monetary policy decisions individually. 
The social components include personal contact between people of different countries 
and cultural proximity, a reality which is ever more present, for example, in the 
everyday life of millions of internet users around the world, at negligible costs. This 
leads to the fact that millions of people around the world consume the same 
entertainment products and thereby end up sharing some of their cultural references 
with each other, even with those who are thousands of kilometers away. 
Economic globalization will evidently be the facet this work will be most concerned 
with. It is usually connected with market liberalization, i.e., the process of removal of 
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trade barriers and other “government-imposed restrictions on movements between 
countries in order to create an open and borderless world economy” (Zhou et al., 2011; 
p. 2) and has as a main consequence an increased trade of goods and services across 
national borders, as well as of higher international capital flows, including Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), which can lead to a fragmentation of the value chain, now 
spread around a variety of countries.  
In this dissertation, we will focus mainly on trade, FDI and technological status, as these 
are the facets of economic globalization mainly focused on by the most relevant and 
widely-discussed mechanisms, and because they are of easier measurement and the ones 
for which there is larger data availability. 
However, there also exist aggregate measures of globalization, such as the already-
mentioned KOF Index of Globalization, which measures, through its composite nature, 
the social and political aspects of globalization as well as the economic ones (Dreher 
and Gaston, 2008). We will use these measures to discuss the overall impacts of 
globalization later on. 
 
2.1.2 Wage inequality 
As is known, not all workers are paid the same. The difference in salary between 
workers with different skills is generally referred to as the skill premium, defined, 
therefore, as “the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers” (Goldberg and 
Pavnick, 2007; p. 52). Several other measures can be used to assess wage inequality 
(e.g., the proportion of low-wage earners, the high-low decile or quartile ratios or the 
Gini coefficient on wages). 
 
Skilled and Unskilled Workers 
To clarify on the operationalization of this concept, it is useful to define how we 
categorize a worker as skilled or unskilled. Empirically, a skilled worker is generally 
defined as a worker with higher (or tertiary) education, while an unskilled worker is 
someone with no more than secondary education. Cho and Díaz (2013), for example, 
analyze “three skill levels (high: corresponding to workers with higher or tertiary 
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education, medium: for workers with secondary education, and low: for workers with 
primary education)” (Cho and Díaz, 2013; p. 603). Similar classifications are found in 
many other sources, for instance, in the EU KLEMS database. 
 
2.2 The mechanisms linking globalization and wage inequality 
In order to identify the several theoretical mechanisms through which globalization 
affects wage inequality, we will review the most well-known and established models of 
trade. 
2.2.1 Early models 
The Ricardian Model of Comparative Advantages is the first and simplest international 
trade model in the economic literature. As described in Krugman et al. (2011), this 
model takes into account a situation in which two countries and only one factor of 
production, labor, exist. Each country will specialize in the production of the good in 
which it has a comparative advantage (i.e., the one for which production involves 
lowest opportunity cost), engaging then in international trade with the other country so 
it can obtain the good in which the other country has a comparative advantage (and in 
the production of which it has, in turn, specialized). In this very simple model, in which 
labor is the only factor, a worker’s wage is exactly the same as the relative price of the 
good it produces and exports (real exchange rate as defined by the ratio between 
exports’ and imports’ price) multiplied by the quantity of the good they have produced. 
The model does not elaborate on the distribution of this income, since it assumes all 
workers within each of the countries earn the same for each unit produced, their wage 
being dependent only, therefore, on the amount of goods they produce. 
Another theory, the Specific Factor model, builds upon the Ricardian model to explain 
within-country inequality and the uneven distribution of the benefits of trade. According 
to this model, and as related once again by to Krugman et al. (2011), distribution of 
income is deeply affected by international trade for two main reasons: (i) in the short-
run, the transfer of resources from one industry to the other involves costs (i.e., transfer 
of resources required for the specialization of the country’s production in the good it has 
a comparative advantage in, according to the Ricardian model) and (ii) in the long-run, 
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the owners of the factors specifically linked to the good in which  the country will 
specialize will benefit from trade while those who own the factors used in producing the 
good in which the foreign country will specialize in will be at a disadvantage; indeed, 
the country specializes in a good that does not require their factors and they will not be 
compensated for owning them. The model also considers general-purpose factors, 
which are interchangeably used in the production of any good: the owners of these 
factors could either win or lose, depending on whether more or less of their factor is 
necessary in the new production paradigm. It is considered that, overall, the gains of one 
group will compensate the losses of the others (or, if owners of general-purpose factors 
also win, the gains of those two groups are expected to compensate the losses of the 
other) so that overall any country participating in international trade is still benefiting 
from it. The question of, within each country, one group being at a disadvantage is not 
considered relevant because overall the country is benefitting. 
Even though the Specific Factor Model does attempt to explain the different effects of 
trade on different groups within a country, it does not fully account for wage 
distribution. There are, however, other, more comprehensive, theories, which are still 
based on the same principles, and that provide a more detailed analysis of the impact of 
international economic relations on income inequality within a country. 
 
2.2.2 The Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) Theorem – theoretical link 
between trade and wage inequality 
According to Baldwin (2008), in 1941, Stolper and Samuelson built on the previously 
published works of Hecksher and Ohlin on trade theory and created what is now 
referred to as the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem (HOS). 
As described in Baldwin (2008) and other International Economics textbooks like 
Krugman et al. (2011), Hecksher and Ohlin assumed, when they built this theorem in 
the 1930s, a two-country, two-good and two-factor model in which both countries have 
a similar level of technology (which, we argue, can be seen as concordant with reality 
even today, given the increasing dissemination of information and communication 
technologies around the globe). It is also assumed that each country has relative 
abundance in one production factor. Trade in goods is the only way through which a 
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country becomes internationally integrated, given that, in this model, production factors 
cannot move between countries.  
An additional assumption in the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem is that, according 
to, e.g., Baldwin (2008), in autarky both countries produce two goods and use both 
factors. If they engage in trading, however, circumstances will change, with each 
country specializing in the good which uses more intensively the factor that is relatively 
more abundant in that country.  
According to Baldwin (2008), the contribution of Stolper and Samuelson to this 
theorem was to take the results by Hecksher and Ohlin on product specialization 
(namely, that each country would export the good intensive in the factor relatively more 
abundant in that country while importing the other good) to conclude, additionally, on 
the impacts such specialization would logically have on factor prices. They theorized 
that specialization would cause relative demand for each production factor to move in 
opposite ways in the two countries: in the North, the demand for skilled labor would 
rise while the demand for unskilled labor would fall; in contrast and symmetrically, in 
the South, demand for unskilled labor would rise and demand for skilled labor would 
fall. Accordingly, this leads to a corresponding rise in the price of the relatively more 
abundant factor and a decrease in the price of the less abundant factor. 
The argument is, therefore, that international trade affects the relative price of these 
factors in different ways in the two countries. It is straightforward to interpret these two 
factors as being skilled and unskilled labor and the two countries as standing in for the 
North and South regions of the globe, with the North being relatively abundant in 
skilled labor, while the South is endowed with relatively more unskilled labor. 
Therefore, if the South is unskilled labor-abundant, trade will make it specialize in the 
unskilled-labor-intensive good and export it to the North. The North will in turn 
specialize in the skilled-labor-intensive good because it is relatively more abundant in 
skilled labor.  
As a result, the Hechsher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theorem predicts that trade will cause the 
wages of skilled workers to rise in the North and fall in the South while the wages of 
unskilled workers are expected to rise in the South and fall in the North, leading to 
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higher wage inequality in the Northern (developed) countries and lower wage inequality 
in the Southern (developing) ones. 
 
2.2.3 Feenstra and Hanson (FH) Theorem – theoretical link between FDI and 
wage inequality 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) argue, however, that analyzing only the trade of final goods 
(as assessed by trade openness) is not enough to account for the effects of globalization 
on wage inequality. As there is a global value chain that slices the production of final 
goods into several parts and distributes them across different parts of the globe, it is 
necessary to analyze the effects of offshoring, measured as Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), specifically the one flowing from the North to the South (in their paper, the 
countries referred to are the United States and Mexico). In their proposed model, it is 
the Northern country that offshores a portion of its production to the South. This portion 
of the production captures mostly the skilled workers in the South, thereby shifting 
demand from unskilled labor to skilled labor in the South, where it is, presumably and 
usually, cheaper. However, in the North, this portion substitutes mostly for the 
production of unskilled workers, which results in a similar shift: demand for unskilled 
labor will fall in the North. This has the effect of increasing wage inequality in both 
countries: in the South, by increasing the price of skilled labor, while having no effect 
on that of unskilled labor; in the North, by decreasing the price of unskilled labor while 
not affecting that of skilled labor. 
 
2.2.4 Tang and Wood Theory – the effects of co-operation costs on wage 
inequality 
Tang and Wood, for their part, take co-operation costs, i.e., the “cost of moving know-
how around the world” (Wood, 2002; p. 55) into account. This know-how “contributes 
to production partly by increasing the quantity of output, but mainly by improving its 
quality” (Wood, 2002; p. 55), e.g., improving factor productivity.  
According to Wood (2002), the Tang and Wood theory assumes that the workers who 
have this ability (know-how) and who can transmit it to others are all located in the 
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North (these are called “K-workers”, while all the other workers fall under the 
denomination of “L-workers”). The authors posit that it is cheaper for this transfer of 
knowledge to happen in the North, because having K-workers working in the South 
involves co-operation costs (the main ones being the extra time spent on work and 
travel, as well as air fares and hotel bills, though the latter are deemed less significant). 
Therefore, in order for this transfer to happen in the South, the L-workers in the South 
(skilled and unskilled) would have to be paid less. According to Wood (2002), the 
authors also conclude that Northern L-workers have higher salaries than Southern L-
workers, because of their proximity and easy access to K-workers, which leads to the 
relatively higher productivity of their work. 
In this theory, according to Wood (2002), when co-operation costs fall, as they do with 
“improvements in travel and communications facilities” (Wood, 2002; p. 56), this will 
result in: i) increased wages for the K-workers because they will be in a position to 
work with more L-workers, as it becomes easier for their involvement to be profitable to 
Southern companies (their access to Southern production is now easier); ii) increased 
wages for the Southern L-workers, since the scarcity of K-work in the South is a factor 
contributing to their lower wages; and iii) decreased wages for the Northern L-workers, 
since there will exist relative scarcity of K-workers in the North (compared to the 
situation before the shift) and their privileged access to know-how is a factor positively 
contributing to their relatively higher wages. Accordingly, a reduction in co-operation 
costs, increases wage disparities in the North (developed countries), while it reduces 
wage disparities across both Southern and Northern countries for the L-workers. 
 
2.2.5 Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC) and wage inequalities 
The evolution of technology has been a constant presence in human history. The turning 
point of technological evolution as we see and think of it today was the Industrial 
Revolution, which introduced heretofore unknown equipment and machinery, as well as 
production techniques which rendered human intervention less crucial or which 
replaced it completely.  
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Also associated with a growing skill premium, SBTC “occurs when technical progress 
increases the total relative demand for skill of the economy (…) for given prices of 
skilled labour, H, and unskilled labour, L.” (Chusseau et al., 2008; p. 412) 
 According to Chusseau et al. (2008), SBTC is usually related to Information and 
Communication Technologies, which, as we know, have been the fulcrum of 
technological change since the 1980s. New information technologies are considered to 
be “more compatible” with high-skilled labor (at least during the adoption phase) and, 
therefore, in order to make full use of them, the economy must demand relatively more 
skilled workers. Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006), in their modeling of earnings inequality, 
not only consider trend inequality to be mainly influenced by technological change, but 
also state that there are always workers who are quicker to absorb these new 
technologies and who become more productive more quickly, citing this as the reason 
why SBTC is a factor in increasing wage inequality. Indeed. Mamoon and Murshed 
(2013) state that “trade flows bring in new technologies and ideas that enhance the 
productivity of all workers, but especially that of skilled workers,” (Mamoon and 
Murshed, 2013; p. 574) the logical conclusion being that it will bring about a rise of the 
skill premium.  
There are two possible mechanisms through which SBTC can act: it can be factor-biased 
or sector-biased. If it is factor-biased, according to Chusseau et al. (2008), SBTC 
appears as a change in the productivity of each factor (the factors here are skilled and 
unskilled labor), leading to a higher relative productivity of skilled labor. In the case of 
a sector bias, Chusseau et al. (2008) refer technological change as having no impact on 
the production function itself (i.e., there is no change in the relative productivity of the 
factors at the firm-level) but, instead, state that this change is felt more keenly in some 
sectors than in others. In this case, and according to Chusseau et al. (2008), the effects 
of technological change are assumed to be felt more strongly in those industries which 
are more skill-intensive, rather that unskill-intensive.“ Such SBTC generates higher 
factor productivity for skilled labor, not at the individual-firm level, but at the economy 
level. They go on to say that, whichever of these aspects is at work, the end result is 
normally one of these two: a higher skill premium or unemployment among unskilled 
labor. SBTC is, then, another mechanism through which wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled workers may increase.  
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It is true that it is not as directly linked to globalization as the other mechanisms we 
have presented are, but we know that ICTs are one of the features that make 
globalization possible: ICTs make the world more connected and globalization is the 
channel which makes technology changes spread quickly across many countries and 
have the above-mentioned effects on the recipient economies. 
Moreover, it is important to note that this mechanism is not completely independent of 
the others. Even when economists point to SBTC, rather than trade, as the main cause of 
growing inequality, the relationship between the two cannot be neglected. Indeed, 
Krugman et al. (2011) mention recent research which has concluded that trade 
contributes indirectly to the increase in inequality associated with SBTC “by 
accelerating this process of technological change” (Krugman et al., 2011; p. 96): the 
reasoning is that firms with more contact with international realities have easier access 
to new technologies. It is even shown by some studies, according to Krugman (2008), 
that when firms begin to export, they also upgrade to production techniques which rely 
more on skilled workers.  
Mamoon and Murshed (2013) expand on the relationship between trade and SBTC by 
arguing that international trade leads to technology transfer “(processes like learning by 
doing)” (Mamoon and Murshed, 2013; p. 590) which not only links HOS and SBTC 
together but also emphasizes why a mechanism like SBTC cannot be left out of a study 
such as ours. Goldberg and Pavnick (2007) go so far as to term it “trade-induced skill-
biased technological change” (Goldberg and Pavnick, 2007; p. 52). 
The effect of the breaking down of the value chain and the subsequent redistribution of 
the different portions throughout different countries is also important: Krugman et al. 
(2011) refer the NAFTA agreement as an opportunity for the United States companies 
to offshore their low-skilled tasks to countries like Mexico, while keeping the high-
skilled ones in the US, thereby increasing relative wage for high-skilled workers at 
home. 
 
2.2.6 Other Mechanisms 
The mechanisms described above are those most commonly addressed in the literature 
attempting to assess how globalization may affect the wage gap. Much of the recent 
 12 
literature is concerned with the effects of globalization as a whole, so it makes sense for 
these mechanisms to be tested together: for example, trade in final goods and services 
does not account for all the facets of economic integration between countries in this 
increasingly globalization age (Chusseau et al., 2008).  
However, several other mechanisms link globalization with inequality.  
Andersen and Sørensen (2011), for instance, make a distinction between the effects of 
increased international trade on different firms, by separating them into two sectors: the 
exporting (tradable) sector and the non-tradable one, with no direct contact with foreign 
markets. In their model, product market integration squeezes protection rents by making 
market entry easier for foreign firms. This also affects income inequality across 
workers: lower profitability in the non-tradable sector leads to lower wages. Instead, in 
the export sector, workers receive some of the additional benefit from lower trade 
frictions: firms’ profits are higher and, therefore wages increase. 
For his part, Gourdon (2011) argues that it is not only North-South trade which widens 
wage inequality in developing countries, but also the recent growth in South-South 
trade, itself a consequence of globalization and increased trade between nations. The 
author presents the richer Southern countries (“middle-income countries”) as the 
“North” amid developing countries, therefore presenting the mechanism through which 
wage inequality develops in these countries as just a transposition of Hecksher-Ohlin 
theory: because these countries are now “the developed countries” in the equation, the 
HOS mechanism will work to widen wage inequality within them. Gourdon also refers 
to sector-biased SBTC as a possible factor in widening inequality within Southern 
countries. He argues that, while North-South trade leads to higher competition and 
productivity in low-skill-intensive industries, South-South trade does the same in 
medium-skill (MSL) and high-skill (HSL) industries, thereby increasing wage 
inequality within Southern countries. 
Betrán and Pons (2013) refer, in addition to widening trade and SBTC, “institutional 
factors” such as the decline in the role of education, the supply of skilled labor and the 
erosion of labor market institutions, related to a loss of power on behalf of trade unions 
and a reduction in the minimum wage, this wage having been designed to protect low-
wage workers and their earnings, as causes for widening wage inequality. As per Betrán 
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and Pons (2013), low-skilled workers were historically more involved in unions and the 
main concerns of labor unions were labor conditions and wages. Therefore, it follows 
that a weakened influence of these institutions would pave the way for higher wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. As for education, namely 
government-provided education, it is the only way of transmitting knowledge in need 
for a future (or present) worker to update skills which could lead them to a higher-paid 
job. The authors consider that “the more schooling in appropriate contents the 
population received, the easier it was to work in skilled and higher paid jobs,” (Betrán 
and Pons, 2013; p. 151) which might reduce wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers by increasing the supply of skilled workers, and would definitely 
decrease inequality in a more general sense, by having workers who would otherwise be 
working in low-paid jobs have the opportunity to do more qualified work. 
According to Betrán and Pons (2013) arguments, globalization is not necessarily linked 
to weakened social protection (in the form of weaker labor market institutions, such as 
minimum wage or other labor-related standards). They state that, during what they refer 
to as “the first globalisation period” (1870-1913) we did not observe a reduction in 
these standards, going even further in arguing that they were created in the first place 
“to protect lower-paid workers when there was an increase in trade and globalization” 
(Betrán and Pons, 2013; p. 150). In the current period of globalization, however, these 
institutions (ie. education and labor) no longer work as they did in the past in developed 
countries and there is no longer a concern for compensating workers for the increase in 
wage inequality brought on by globalization.  
However, while it is true that these standards are a more a result of political decisions 
than a direct result from more international trade, it is also true that the pressure to enact 
fiscal policies that are more attractive to companies would not exist in a less globalized 
world, where each company would have to comply to the policies of its own country’s 
government.  
Furthermore, according to Bertola (2008), while early inequality was mainly related 
with different capital and land endowments, recent changes in inequality are more 
related to labor incomes, and the education is more and more relevant when it comes to 
which opportunities workers have and how much they earn. (We can also conclude that 
the conditions one has at birth are relevant as well. On the one hand, wages are not the 
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only relevant variable to measure inequality, but they are an increasingly more 
important one, since, for instance, initial endowments are now less important than 
before. On the other hand, however, institutional factors prove to be key influences. 
Lack of investment in education and the decreasing power of labor unions provide less 
of a chance for social mobility, which would unambiguously decrease wage inequality. 
 
2.3 Literature on empirical evidence 
Betrán and Pons (2013) argue that, even though globalization is not a recent 
phenomenon, it is not exactly the same now as it was in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Early-periods of globalization focused on “mass migration to the New World” (Betrán 
and Pons, 2013; p. 147) while the contemporary process is more focused on “trade and 
foreign direct investment” (Betrán and Pons, 2013; p. 147). 
There are several different mechanisms working to enhance or offset each other when it 
comes to wage inequality, especially in what concerns the link between globalization 
and inequality. The theoretical mechanisms described above all speak of an effect of 
globalization (in its many forms) on wage inequality, but they don’t predict the same 
results, especially when it comes to comparing developed and developing countries. It is 
then up to empirical works to validate these theories and to show how they can be 
applied to real, complex economies. 
It is worth mentioning that, in many studies, wage inequality is frequently identified 
with more general inequality measures, such as gross income or disposable income 
inequality, given that wage is the main source of personal income for most of the 
people. However, a word of caution is in order: disposable income is net of taxes and 
transfers from the government and thus, the redistributive policy is likely to be non-
neutral for the assessment of inequality. Analysis of how globalization affects such 
measures of income inequality must control for redistributive policies. 
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2.3.1 Testing the HOS Theorem 
This framework has mostly been used to compare countries with each other (Dreher and 
Gaston, 2008; Elmawazini et al., 2013), as well as to analyze regions within countries, 
more often the US states (Chordokrak and Chintrakarn, 2011) and Chinese regions (Han 
et al., 2012), although some studies for single countries, e.g., Italy (Matano and 
Naticchioni, 2010), are also found in the literature. In most studies, however, the main 
focus is not how trade affects countries in relation to each other (“North” vs. “South”), 
but rather on how trade has affected one or a set of countries unilaterally (i.e., belonging 
either to “North” or “South”). For example, Han et al. (2012) test the role of the rising 
levels of international trade in China, a “labor-abundant developing country”, and 
conclude that they have increased inequality. 
Empirical tests of the HOS theorem have not given unambiguous, consensual, results. 
While the predicted effect on developed countries (a raise in the skill premium) exhibits 
significant empirical support (Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Matano and Naticchioni, 2010; 
Chordokrak and Chintakram, 2011), there is also a vast part of the literature which 
argues that the wage gap, and therefore, inequality, has been on the rise in developing 
countries and that international trade is one of the more (if not the most) important 
factors (, Gourdon, 2011; Han et al., 2012; Elmawazini et al., 2013). 
Goldberg and Pavnick (2007), a widely cited study, found that in the 7 developing 
countries it examined (all of which are known for having gone through a major trade 
policy reshaping between the 1970s and the 1990s) skill premium and, in most cases, 
consequently, wider wage inequality increased. They warn against linking these two 
facts too quickly, reminding us it’s necessary to take other factors into account, yet 
present quite clearly a non-validation of the HOS theorem. 
Meschi and Vivarelli (2009) conclude that aggregate trade flows have no impact on 
wage inequality in developing countries, yet when they disaggregate these flows 
according to their origin and destination (because they believe trade with higher-income 
is the one likely to spread new technology and know-how, therefore, to be the one that 
is truly skill-biased, resulting in a higher skill premium.), they find that when lower-
income countries trade with middle-income countries, it does lead to higher income 
inequality in the former. Trade between lower-income countries leads instead to lower 
 16 
income inequality. These results do not validate the mechanism, for if we consider 
lower-income countries to be the “Southern” developing countries and middle-income 
countries to be “the North” in this dichotomy, trade between them should lead to lower 
inequality in the lower-income countries. 
Similarly, Gourdon (2011) concludes that, for developing countries, trade with other 
developing countries is even more conducive to an increase in wage inequality than 
trade with developed countries: “an increase of 1% in the share of south trade relative 
to north trade increases inter- industry wage inequality by 0.027%” (Gourdon, 2011; p. 
369). His analysis rests on much the same principles as Meschi and Vivarelli’s (2009) 
(within “Southern” countries, middle-income is the North, low-income is the South), yet 
it does not reach the same conclusion: South-South trade is more penalizing for middle-
income countries, as predicted by the transposition of the HOS mechanism that has been 
implied. 
Khalifa (2014) reaches much the same conclusion, going so far as to prove there is a 
“skill-abundance threshold”, above which a country’s skill premium is increased by 
trade with countries with lower skill. The logic and conclusions are not very different 
from the papers discussed in the two above paragraphs, for it is assumed that what 
distinguishes middle-income and lower-income countries (as well as North and South in 
the original theory) is their relative skill abundance.  
Other works focusing on OECD countries, however, (for instance OECD (2011)), 
suggest that trade has no significant role in affecting wage inequality. Krugman’s 
(2008) review of empirical literature on how US trade with developing countries had 
affected the country’s skill premium also shows a modest effect.  
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the most important studies focusing on the effects of 
international trade on several inequality measures. The table details the validation (or 
not) of the HOS theorem, describes the sample and the estimation method of the study. 
From the results presented in Table 2.1 we can conclude that empirical results of the 
HOS theorem are decidedly mixed 
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Table 2.1 - Testing the HOS mechanism 
 
Authors 
Sample 
Countries 
Sample 
Period 
Wage 
inequality 
measure 
Methodology Validation Non-validation 
Goldberg 
and 
Pavnick 
(2007) 
7 
developing 
countries 
Mexico, 
Colombia, 
Argentina, 
Brazil, 
Chile, 
India, 
Hong Kong 
21 country-
decade 
observations: 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
wage gap 
between 
skilled and 
unskilled 
workers 
90–10 log 
wage 
differential 
Gini of log 
wages 
GINI 
index 
No 
Regression  x 
Bertola 
(2008) 
14 
countries 
Estonia, 
Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Portugal, 
Romania, 
Spain, 
Switzerland, 
Turkey, 
United 
Kingdom, 
United 
States 
Irregular 
observations 
between 1970 
and 2000 
Yearly data 
GINI 
Index 
OLS 
regressions  
x 
(The author 
finds no 
significant 
correlation 
between 
trade and 
inequality) 
Dreher and   
Gaston 
(2008) 
100 
countries: 
24 OECD 
countries 
76 Non-
OECD 
countries 
1970-2000 
Averages over 
five years 
Theil 
index of 
Industrial 
Pay 
Inequality 
Household 
income 
inequality 
GMM 
x 
 
(for OECD 
countries) 
(No robust 
impact found 
on inequality 
for 
developing 
countries) 
Meschi and 
Vivarelli 
(2009) 
65 
developing 
countries 
 
1980-1999 
Yearly data 
Estimated 
Household 
Income 
Inequality 
Index 
LSDVC 
estimation  
x 
(trade with 
industrialized 
nations 
worsen 
inequality) 
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Matano and 
Naticchioni 
(2010) 
Italy 
1991-2002 
Yearly data 
Gini index 
Log of 
Average 
Wage 
Ratio of 
Skilled to 
Unskilled 
OLS 
Random 
Effects 
x  
Chordokrak 
and 
Chintrakarn 
(2011) 
48 US 
States 
1988-2003 
Yearly Data 
top 1% 
income 
share 
top 10% 
income 
share 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
 
relative 
mean 
deviation 
(RMD) 
 
Atkinson 
index 
 
Theil 
index of 
Industrial 
Pay 
Inequality 
OLS Fixed 
Effects  
x 
(lack of 
statistically 
significant 
data) 
Gourdon 
(2011) 
67 
developing 
countries 
1976–2000 
Yearly data 
Standard 
deviation 
of the 
logarithm 
of wage by 
industry 
Theil 
index 
OLS 
GMM 
x  
Han et al. 
(2012) 
6 Chinese 
regions 
 
1988–2008 
Yearly Data 
wage gap 
between 
percentiles 
(10th and 
90th, 50th 
and 90th, 
10th and 
50th) 
Fixed Effects  
x 
(trade 
contributes 
to higher 
inequality) 
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Munshi 
(2012) Bangladesh 
plants in five 
manufacturing 
industries 
28 time series 
observations 
covering the 
1975–2002 
period 
real wages 
of skilled 
and 
unskilled 
workers 
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
2SLS 
x 
(author 
finds trade 
lowers 
inequality) 
 
Elmawazini 
et al.( 
2013) 
8 South-
East Europe 
and CIS 
countries 
1992-2007 
Yearly data 
GINI 
Index 
LSDV 
Method 
Parks (1967) 
method 
 
x 
(trade makes 
inequality 
rise in 
transition 
economies) 
Khalifa 
(2014) 
25 
developing 
countries 
1980-2000 
Yearly data 
Theil 
index of 
Industrial 
Pay 
Inequality 
OLS 
white-
correlated 
SEs 
x  
 
2.3.2 Testing the FH Theorem 
This mechanism and ensuing predictions find a strong support in recent empirical 
literature on the effects of globalization on wage inequality. Indeed, FDI is widely 
regarded as being a very significant part of the economic dimension of globalization, 
establishing interactions between developed and developing countries. Several studies 
find a positive relation between the rise of FDI outflow levels in developed countries 
and rising inequality (OECD, 2011) while others report a link between growing FDI 
inflow levels and rising inequality in developing countries (Chen et al., 2011; Figini and 
Görg, 2011), even as they credit FDI with fostering economic growth in these countries.   
Choi (2006) finds that FDI has the effect of raising inequality in all the 119 (developed 
and developing) analyzed countries, with a special emphasis given to outward FDI, 
which turned out to have a more pronounced effect on income equality. 
In his analysis of South-South relations and of their impact on inequality in developing 
countries, Gourdon (2011) also concludes that increasing flows of FDI do tend to 
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increase wage inequality, since FDI mainly occurs in more skill-intensive sectors. This 
seems to be a concern only in “upper-middle income countries”, i.e., in the richer 
Southern countries, “where FDI is more important and where skilled labor is more 
present” (Gourdon, 2011; p. 369). 
Figini and Görg (2011), however, also find that inward FDI has the effect of decreasing 
wage inequality in developed countries. This does not necessarily go against the FH 
theory, since the effects of inward FDI on developed countries are not predicted by the 
theory. Chordokrak and Chintrakarn (2011), however, find that, in the US, inward FDI 
contributes to a rise in wage inequality. 
Similarly, Çelik and Basdas (2010) find that FDI inflows contribute to greater equality 
both in developed and developing countries. However, when they analyze the Asian 
“miracle countries”, they find that inequality rises along with these inflows.   
Table 2.2 summarizes the most important studies focusing on the effects of FDI on 
several inequality measures. The table details the validation (or not) of the FH theorem, 
describes the sample and the estimation method of the study. 
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Table 2.2 - Testing the FH mechanism 
 
Authors 
Sample 
Countries 
Sample 
Period 
Wage 
inequality 
measure 
Methodology Validation Non-validation 
Choi 
(2006) 
119 
countries 
1993 to 
2002 
Yearly 
data 
Gini index Pooled OLS x  
Çelik and 
Basdas 
(2010) 
5 
developed 
countries 
5 
developing 
countries 
6 miracle 
countries 
1995-2007 
Yearly 
data 
Gini 
coefficient 
Fully 
Modified 
OLS 
 x 
Chen et al. 
(2011) China 
1998-2007 
Yearly 
Data 
log of the 
average wage 
level in each 
enterprise in 
each year 
OLS Fixed 
Effects x  
Chordokrak 
and 
Chintrakarn 
(2011) 
48 US 
States 
1988-2003 
Yearly 
Data 
top 1% 
income share 
top 10% 
income share 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
relative mean 
deviation 
 
Atkinson 
index 
 
Theil’s 
entropy index 
OLS Fixed 
Effects x  
Figini and 
Görg 
(2011) 
103 
countries: 
 
34 OECD 
countries 
1980-2002 
Yearly 
data 
Gini index 
Theil index 
GMM  x 
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69 Non-
OECD 
countries 
Gourdon 
(2011) 
67 
developing 
countries 
1976–
2000  
Yearly 
data 
standard deviation of the 
logarithm of wage by industry 
Theil index 
GMM x 
OECD 
(2011) 
34 OECD 
countries 1975-2010 
(Regression not available.)  x 
Tomohara 
and Yokota 
(2011) 
Thailand 
1999-2003 
Yearly 
data 
share of skilled 
labour’s wages 
in an 
establishment’s 
total wage bill 
wages of 
skilled and 
unskilled 
workers 
Fixed 
Effects 
x  
Elmawazini 
et al.(2013) 
8 South-
East 
Europe 
and CIS 
countries 
1992-2007 
Yearly 
data 
GINI Index 
Least 
Squares 
Method and 
Parks (1967) 
method 
x  
Franco and 
Gerussi 
(2013) 
17 
Transition 
Economies 
1990-2006 
Yearly 
data 
Gini index 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDVC 
 x 
Rivera and 
Castro 
(2013) 
13 Latin 
America 
countries 
Depending 
on the 
country, 
the data 
period 
varies 
from 1978 
to 2000 
wages of 
skilled and 
unskilled 
workers 
OLS x  
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2.3.3 Testing the Skill-Biased Technological Change Theory 
Chusseau et al. (2008) have done an extensive literature review of empirical studies 
trying to conclude whether North-South trade or SBTC are the main factors in growing 
wage inequality. They conclude that, from initial studies trying to isolate one “guilty 
party” of growing inequality, both theoretical and empirical literature have evolved 
towards more complex frameworks and that it is not possible to completely extricate the 
effects of these mechanisms from one another: they are both conducive to higher wage 
inequality within countries. 
Gourdon (2011) proves that when technological change is geared towards unskilled-
labor intensive sectors, “it decreases wage inequality across industries, for all groups of 
countries, although it is not significant for upper-middle income countries” (Gourdon, 
2011; p. 370). The issue then happens when technological change is skill-biased, as the 
title suggests, it is not necessarily a problem of technological advancement in itself. 
Almeida and Afonso (2010), from a sample of 25 OECD countries, analyze the relative 
influence of SBTC and International Trade (IT) on the increasing wage premium. Even 
though its relative importance depends on which wage inequality measure the authors 
use (the effect of SBTC is felt more keenly when the authors use the wage ratio of 
college graduates to lower-secondary graduates as opposed to the ratio of earnings of 
college graduates to upper-secondary graduates), SBTC is always a key factor in 
increasing wage inequality, especially in developed countries. 
Esposito and Stehrer (2008), in their analysis of “transitional economies” (economies in 
the process of switching from central-planning to a capitalist economic system) namely 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, conclude that “the concentration of SBTC in 
skill intensive industries explains part of the rise in the skill premium” (Esposito and 
Stehrer, 2008; p. 363) in these countries, validating the importance of SBTC in wage 
inequality. 
Mamoon and Murshed (2013)’s study argues that, while an initial greater stock of 
skilled labor causes trade openness to have the effect of diminishing equality in 
developing countries, after trade liberalization higher education levels accrued might 
lead to higher inequality. They suggest that developing countries should invest in 
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primary and secondary education, and not focus only on higher education, since this 
would bridge the skill gap and lead to greater equality.  
Haskel and Slughter (2002)’s results state that it’s sector-biased SBTC, rather than 
factor-biased SBTC which has a more pronounced effect on skill premia: when the 
technological change takes place in skill-intensive sectors, the skill premium rises, and 
conversely when it takes place in unskilled-intensive sectors, it falls. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the analysis above, providing additional details on different 
inequality measures, on the methodology as well as on the sample covered by the study.  
 
Table 2.3 – Testing the Skill-Biased Technological Change Mechanism 
 
Authors 
Sample 
Countries 
Sample 
Period 
Wage 
inequality 
measure 
Methodolog
y Validation 
Non-
validation 
Haskel and 
Slaughter 
(2002) 
10 OECD 
countries 
1970s	  
1980s 
Percent 
changes in 
manufacturi
ng-wide 
average 
annual non- 
production 
earnings 
relative to 
the average 
annual 
production 
earnings 
Weighted 
least squares 
method 
x  
Chussseau 
et al. (2008)	   The paper itself is a literature review.	  
x  
Esposito and 
Stehrer 
(2008) 
Three 
European 
transitional 
economies 
(Czech 
Republic, 
Hungary, 
Poland) 
 
1995-2003 
ratio of wage 
in more 
skill-
intensive 
industries to 
the wage 
less skill-
intensive 
industries 
Pooled OLS x  
Almeida and 
Afonso 
(2010)	  
25 OECD 
countries	   1997-2006	  
ratio of 
earnings of 
college 
graduates to 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model 
Random 
x	  
(SBTC is the 
main 
explanation 
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2.3.4 Testing the Tang-Wood Theory 
Anderson (2006) has tested this mechanism and has been able to validate it in some 
way, by offering empirical evidence of the fact that developing countries with lower 
cooperation costs tend to have higher wages. 
However, extensive empirical testing of this mechanism does not seem to exist. 
As we can see, economic literature is not unanimous on the impacts of globalization on 
inequality, even as it takes the overall benefits of globalization as a given. The 
relationship between globalization and wage inequality is a multi-faceted one, as the 
variety of mechanisms described above can attest. We propose to test these mechanisms 
ourselves using the methodology detailed in the next section. 
  
upper-
secondary 
graduates	  
wage ratio of 
college 
graduates to 
lower-
secondary 
graduates	  
Moments 
Model 
for an 
increase in 
wage 
premium in 
developed 
countries) 
Gourdon 
(2011)	  
67 
developing 
countries	  
1976–2000 	  
standard 
deviation of 
the 
logarithm of 
wage by 
industry	  
Theil index	  
OLS 
GMM 
x  
Mamoon 
and 
Murshed	  
(2013)	  
108 
developing 
countries  
latest value 
available for 
the Theil 
index for 
every 
country in 
the 1990s 
Theil index	  
OLS 
IV 
x  
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 The samples 
Our sample is comprised of the 28 countries that were member-states of the European 
Union (EU) as of 2014. It is our contention that we can, within the universe of the 
European Union, distinguish between countries which are the intra-EU equivalent to 
“North” and “South” countries, since these definitions are intrinsically comparative. 
The “South” sample is comprised of the EU-countries with average (2000-2011) GDP 
per capita (PPP constant 2011) below 30 thousand international dollars (data in Table 
A.1, in Annex A, taken from the World Bank databank1), or that joined the European 
Union from 2004 onwards. This group of countries includes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
The “North” countries are the remaining countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
As regards time dimension, we use data covering the period between 1970 and 2007. 
Smaller time-horizons are defined, due to data restrictions, when testing the HOS and 
SBTC mechanisms (1993-2007 and 1982-2007, respectively). 
 
3.2 The model 
We propose a general panel data model, using these two samples and covering for the 
period detailed above. The model general specification can be represented as follows 
(Gujarati, 2004; page 656): 
 𝑻!" = 𝑪! + 𝛅! +   𝜷𝑿!" + 𝒖!"  ,       (3.1) 
 
                                                
1 World Bank databank accessed at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, on April 2014 
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with t = 1971, …, 2007, and applied to two samples of countries, the 13 “North” 
countries and the 15 “South” countries, both detailed above (subscript i). 
The dependent variable, T, is the Theil index of industrial wage inequality, widely used 
in the related empirical literature, extracted from a database put together by the 
University of Texas Inequality Project and based on United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) data. We chose this variable instead of the also 
widely used Gini index because it focuses on actual earned income, instead of overall 
disposable income and a wage inequality measure seems to be more adequate to test the 
alternative theoretical predictions outlined in the previous chapter. 
The Theil’s t-statistic (T) of industrial pay inequality is computed as: 
 
 𝑻 =    𝟏𝑵 𝒙𝒊𝒙    ∙ 𝒍𝒏 𝒙𝒊𝒙𝑵𝒊!𝟏  ,         (3.2) 
 
where 𝒙𝒊 is the income of each individual i, 𝒙 is the average income of the group, and N 
is the total number of individuals. As T is a measure of entropy, the index measures the 
disorder in a system: therefore, equality is at its peak when Theil = 0. The higher the 
index is, the higher the inequality within whichever population is under scrutiny. 
Matrix X includes the independent variables, while u is the vector of error terms. 
Independent variables are used with a period lag since it is reasonable to expect that 
impacts on inequality are not of a contemporaneous nature. 
We use several independent variables related to the alternative dimensions of 
globalization. Trade Openness is our chosen measure of international trade, which we 
use to test the HOS mechanism; it is defined as the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services in percentage of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). FDI 
inflows and FDI outflows (in percentage of GDP) are used to test the FH mechanism. 
Finally, the percentage of High Tech Exports in total manufactured exports and the 
percentage of GERD (Gross Expenditure in Research and Development over GDP) 
are chosen proxies to capture whether the country is technologically advanced (thus 
testing the SBTC mechanism). High-tech exports are defined as exports of products 
with high R&D intensity (like computers, scientific instruments, etc.) and Expenditure 
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on Research and Development refers to how much is currently being spent (including 
both public and private expense) on developing the country’s production processes, as a 
proxy of the technological level of a country, which is presumably a result of how much 
is being spent to develop it. 
We also control for other aspects of globalization using broader measures of 
globalization. In particular, we use the aggregate KOF Globalization Index, a 
composite index measuring globalization, which includes, besides economic, social and 
political aspects of globalization. Specifically, the index is divided into three sections 
(A, B and C), which include variables related to the different aspects of globalization. 
Section A is concerned with the Economic aspects of globalization and includes A.1 - 
Actual Flows (i.e., Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment and Income 
Payments to Foreign Nationals) and A.2 – Restrictions (i.e., Hidden Import Barriers, 
Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes on International Trade and Capital Account Restrictions) 
Sections B and C are concerned, respectively, with Social and Political aspects of the 
phenomenon. More detailed information can be found in Table B.1, Annex B. 
Moreover, we want to control for several explanatory variables. Trade Union Density is 
used to measure the degree to which labor institutions at work within each country 
affect wage inequality. Unions are expected to reduce wage inequality, as described by 
Betrán and Pons (2013), and as referred in the previous chapter. Rate of Lower 
Secondary Education Completion is used as a measure of the stock of human capital. 
We use secondary education completion levels and not those of higher education, 
because “there is some evidence that secondary education is more important in 
alleviating wage inequality than higher levels of education” (Mamoon and Murshed, 
2013; p. 577). Finally, in order to capture the level of development, we control for the 
lnGDP per capita, as used for instance by Milanovic and Squire (2007) and Afonso et 
al. (2008.) 
Table 3.1 provides the reader with a summary of the data sources used. The period 
intervals describe the earliest and latest year for which we have data. There are some 
gaps, especially in the “South” sample. As for the GERD variable, the process through 
which we decided to use two sources was the following: we first checked the World 
Bank databank and realized it only had data from 1996 onwards. Upon checking the 
OECD database, we realized it had more data but only for the “North” countries. Since 
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the numbers from 1996 onwards matched exactly between the two databases, we 
decided to use the OECD data to make sure we could cover more years in the “North” 
regressions. 
Table 3.1 Data Sources 
Variable Period Source 
Theil 1970-2007 TIP-UNIDO database2 
Trade Openness 1970-2007 World Bank databank3 
FDI Inflows 1970-2007 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development4 
FDI Outflows 1970-2007 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development5 
High Tech Exports 1988-2007 World Bank databank6 
GERD 
“North”: 1981-2007 
“South”: 1996-2007 
OECD database7 
World Bank databank8 
KOF Globalization Index 1970-2007 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology9 
lnGDP 1970-2007 
Computed from 
World Bank databank10 data 
Secondary Education 
Completion 1992-2007 Eurostat
11 
Union Density 1970-2007 ICWTTS12 
 
                                                
2 Database accessed at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/ on April 2014. 
3 World Bank databank accessed at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, on April 2014 
4 UNCTAD database accessed at http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx, on April 2014 
5 UNCTAD database accessed at http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx, on April 2014 
6 World Bank databank accessed at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, on April 2014 
7 OECD database accessed at http://oecd-ilibrary.org, on April 2014 
8 World Bank databank accessed at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, on April 2014 
9 The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology accessed at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/,on April 2014.  
10 World Bank databank accessed at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, on April 2014 
11 Eurostat database accessed at http//ec.europa.eu/Eurostat, on May 2014. 
12 ICWTTS database accesed at http://www.uva-aias.net/208, on April 2014 
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3.3 Choosing between Fixed and Random Effects 
Since both samples are comprised solely of European Union countries, and therefore are 
not taken from a random sample, we conjecture that the general form is a fixed-effects 
model rather than a random-effects model. Quoting Gujarati (2004), “[i]f it is assumed 
that εi and the X’s are uncorrelated, REM [Random Effects Model] may be appropriate, 
whereas if εi and the X’s are correlated, FEM [Fixed Effects Model] may be 
appropriate.” (Gujarati, 2004; p. 650). He goes on to explain the error term εi might be 
correlated in the case of a sample in which the aspects included in the error term (i.e., 
things that are relevant but not in the regressions. Thus, 𝑪!    (our εi) and 𝛅! are vectors 
that include constant terms capturing, respectively, cross-section and period fixed 
effects. In order to confirm our conjecture, we decided to run the Hausman test; as an 
example, results are shown in Table 3.2 for the case of the equation testing the All 
Effects regression. 
 
Table 3.2 - Hausman test for the All Effects regression 
 
“North” “South” 
 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. 
d.f. Prob. 
Cross-
section 
random 
131.135261 8 0.0000 21.731477 
 
8 0.0054 
 
The results on the Hausman test, in Table 3.2, point towards a rejection of the null 
hypothesis (which would lead us to a random-effects model). Although reported results 
apply to the regression testing all the mechanisms together (see regression in Table 
4.14, in chapter 4, below), similar results were robust for the other regressions. 
Therefore, we will, as conjectured, decide for a fixed-effects model to assess the effects 
of globalization on wage inequality, using both samples. 
In addition, we performed the Redundant Fixed Effects tests as to assess the presence of 
either cross-section or period fixed effects or both; detailed results are shown below, in 
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Table 3.3, also for the case of the regression which includes all mechanisms (see 
regression in Table 4.14, in chapter 4, below). 
 
Table 3.3 - Test for cross-section and period fixed effects for the All Effects 
regression 
 
“North” “South” 
Redundant 
Fixed Effects 
Tests 
Statistic d.f. Prob. Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section 
F 47.149318 (12,205) 0.0000 15.803030 (12,63) 0.0000 
Cross-section 
Chi-square 
332.42649
5 12 0.0000 130.548744 12 0.0000 
Period F 0.996445 (25,205) 0.4735 0.550114 (10,63) 0.8476 
Period F Chi-
square 28.785393 25 0.2730 7.869271 10 0.6416 
Cross-
section/Period 
F 
16.227127 (37,205) 0.0000 9.255068 (22,63) 0.0000 
Cross-
section/Period 
Chi-square 
343.45175
0 37 0.0000 135.609836 22 0.0000 
 
As we can see from the results in Table 3.3 above, cross-sections fixed effects are found 
in both these samples, with p-values for both samples being well below 10%. Period 
fixed effects are clearly rejected. Cross-section/period fixed effects are also significant 
but we can assume these are derived from the results on cross-section effects. Since the 
presence of cross-section effects is robust, and given the comparability of results 
between samples and the better underlying overall adjustment, we estimate the model 
considering solely cross-section fixed effects. 
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3.4 Expected effects of globalization on the Theil Index 
Table 3.4, below, shows the expected effects of each of the globalization-related 
variables on the Theil Index, according to the theories we reviewed above. 
Table 3.4 Theory-based expected effects of globalization on the Theil Index 
Variable 
Trade 
Opennes
s 
FDI 
Inflo
ws 
FDI 
Outflo
ws 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
Expenditu
re on 
R&D 
Tested Mechanism HOS FH SBTC 
Expected Effect on Theil 
Index 
(“North” countries) 
(+) • (+) (+) (+) 
Expected Effect on Theil 
Index 
(“South” countries) 
(-) (+) • (+) (+) 
 
Most of these variables, in theory, are positively correlated to inequality. Therefore, we 
are expecting a positive signal on all instances, except when it comes to the influence of 
trade in the Southern sample.  
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4. Analysis of Results 
4.1. Overview of wage inequality and trade patterns in the EU 
 
Inequality Trends in the European Union 
Before analyzing the results, we will begin with a brief look at the trends for the chosen 
inequality variable – Theil index of industrial pay inequality. Since we have available 
data, we analyze the (percent) change in the Theil index for the period from 1970 to 
2007, as well as the (percent) change for the ten-year sub-periods. Table 4.1 and Table 
4.2 report the results for the “North” and “South” subsamples, respectively.13 
 
Table 4.1 - Theil Index Evolution - "North" 
 
 1970-1980	   1980-1990	   1990-2000	   2000-2007	   1970-2007	  Austria	   -12%	   22%	   11%	   -19%	   -3%	  
Belgium	   39%	   -12%	   -4% 26%	   49%	  
Denmark	   9%	   8%	   36%	   4%	   68%	  
Finland	   -28%	   -7%	   2%	   40%	   -4% 
France	   -3%1	   -7%	   37%	   -9%	   12%	  
Germany	   -10%	   -1% 2%2	   -	   -10%4	  
Ireland	   4%	   22%	   -53%	   25%	   -26%	  
Italy	   -70%	   23%	   68%	   -16%	   -47%	  
Luxembourg	   -20%	   29%	   -29%	   120%	   62%	  
Netherlands	   -50%	   33%	   10%	   7%3	   -22%5	  
Spain	   -55%	   41%	   15%	   -36%	   -53%	  
Sweden	   -36%	   -1%	   29%	   -	   -18%6	  
United 
Kingdom	   -7%	   42%	   17%	   -27%	   13%	  
Notes: (1) Values in bold represent increases in wage inequality. 
 (2) In some cases, data was not available for all years. Check superscript: 1. 1977-1979; 2. 1990-
1992; 3. 2000-2005; 4.1970-1992; 5. 1970-2005; 1970-2000 
 (3) Source: University of Texas Inequality Project – based on UNIDO data. 
 
The literature seems to take as granted the fact that inequality is growing. For the 
“North” sample, the most obvious rising trend in the inequality numbers occurred 
                                                
13 In our panel analysis, below, we will not be able to use such a long span due to data restrictions on the 
other variables. 
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during the 80s, with the 90s also being a strong decade for rising inequality. Overall, 
between 1970 and 2007, only five countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom) out of our sample of 13 had a rise in inequality but, as we can 
see, the fluctuations in-between these years were numerous and affected all countries of 
the sample. 
We can also conclude, however, with the help of the descriptive statistics present in 
Annex C, that the difference between minimum and maximum values is not very large 
(0.042). 
Table 4.2 - Theil Index Evolution - "South" 
  
1970-1980	   1980-1990	   1990-2000	   2000-2007	   1970-2007	  
Bulgaria	  
 
48% -29% 1223% -7% 1183% 
Croatia	  
 
- 164%2 14% -1% 197%13 
Cyprus	  
 
-7% -27% -45% -42% -79% 
Czech Republic	  
 
- -25%3 375% -22% 176%14 
Estonia	  
 
- - - -7% -7%15 
Greece	  
 
29% -4% -15%6 -13%11 23% 
Hungary	  
 
-53% 202% 183% 39% 459% 
Latvia	  
 
- - -73%7 1% -72%16 
Lithuania	  
 
- - 262%8 -30% 152%17 
Malta	  
 
-43% 8% 160% 48% 136% 
Poland 
 
10% 45% 201% 0% 379% 
Portugal	  
 
22%1 43%4 -2%9 -14%12 87%18 
Romania	  
 
- - 906% -1% 894%19 
Slovak 
Republic	  
 
- - 71%10 16% 98%20 
Slovenia	  
 
- 189%5 55% 62% 625%21 
Notes: (1) Values in bold represent increase in wage inequality. 
 (2) In some cases, data was not available for all years. Check superscript: 1. 1973-1980; 2. 1986-
1990; 3. 1987-1990; 4. 1980-1987; 5. 1987-1990; 6. 1990-1998; 7. 1993-2000; 8. 1992-2000; 9. 
1994-2000; 10. 1991-2000; 11. 2003-2007; 12. 2005-2007; 13. 1986-2007; 14. 1987-2007; 15. 
2000-2007; 16. 1993-2007; 17. 1992-2007; 18. 1973-2007; 19. 1990-2007; 20. 1991-2007; 21. 
1987-2007 
 (3) Source: University of Texas Inequality Project – based on UNIDO data. 
 
In the “South” sample, we were presented with more gaps in the data. However, we can 
see that inequality rises substantially by more than in the “North” sample. Between 
1970 and 2007, only Cyprus displays a falling trend in inequality. In Bulgaria, the rise 
between 1970 and 2007 has been of over 1,000%, with many of the other countries also 
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exhibiting rises of over 100%. The difference between maximum and minimum values 
is also noticeably higher than in the “North” sample, roughly of 0.071. 
As for the standard deviation, the value in the “South” sample is more than the double 
of that observed for the “North” sample (0.015526 vs. 0.007082). 
As we can see, the countries in the “South” sample clearly exhibit a very different 
pattern from the ones in the “North” sample. This motivates us to study them separately. 
 
Main Trading Partners 
We did a cursory analysis of the weight of intra-EU trade for these countries. It is 
widely known that the European Union (EU) countries trade mostly with EU 
counterparts. If that is the case for our sample, this motivates an assessment of the HOS 
mechanism within the EU countries. 
 
Table 4.3 - Main Trading Partners - "North" 
 
% of Intra-EU in Total 
Exports	  
% of intra-EU in Total 
Imports	  
Austria 74% 80% 
Belgium	   76%	   71%	  
Denmark	   69%	   72%	  
Finland	   59%	   66%	  
France	   64%	   69%	  
Germany	   64%	   65%	  
Ireland	   63%	   67%	  
Italy	   61%	   60%	  
Luxembourg	   88%	   78%	  
The Netherlands	   80%	   51%	  
Spain	   72%	   65%	  
Sweden	   59%	   70%	  
United Kingdom	   58%	   53%	  
Average	   68%	   67%	  
Notes: (1) Average between 1999 and 2011.  
(2) Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 4.4 - Main Trading Partners - "South" 
 
 
% of Intra-EU in Total 
Exports 
% of intra-EU in Total 
Imports 
Bulgaria 61% 58% 
Croatia 63% 66% 
Cyprus 65% 66% 
Czech Republic 86% 77% 
Estonia 76% 74% 
Greece 62% 59% 
Hungary 82% 68% 
Latvia 74% 76% 
Lithuania 66% 59% 
Malta 46% 71% 
Poland 80% 72% 
Portugal 79% 77% 
Romania 73% 69% 
Slovakia 88% 74% 
Slovenia 78% 79% 
Average 72% 70% 
Notes: (1) Average between 1999 and 2011.  
(2) Source: Eurostat. 
 
As we can see in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the weight of intra-EU trade is obvious and present 
in both samples, although the averages are slightly higher in the “South” sample.  
In an attempt to analyze whether these weights have changed with EU membership, we 
considered, for the “South” sample, pre- and post-European Union periods for a more 
detailed analysis (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 - Main Trading Partners - "South" (pre- and post-EU integration) 
Notes: (1) Average between 1999 and year of entry into the EU, then between year of entry and 2011. 
(2) Source: Eurostat. 
 
Interestingly, while the weight of intra-EU exports in total exports rose for these 
countries after they joined the EU, the weight of intra-EU trade in total imports has 
decreased. 
 
4.2. Testing the HOS mechanism 
We attempted to test the HOS mechanism by first running the regression using the data 
for the two samples separately (see results in Table 4.6). Since we have data restrictions, 
time horizon covers the period from 1993 to 2007. 
 
 
 % of Intra-EU in Total Exports 
% of Intra-EU in Total 
Imports 
 Pre-EU Post-EU Pre-EU Post-EU 
Bulgaria 62% 61% 59% 58% 
Croatia - - - - 
Cyprus 69% 59% 70% 59% 
Czech Republic 86% 87% 78% 74% 
Estonia 71% 84% 77% 69% 
Greece - - - - 
Hungary 80% 85% 69% 67% 
Latvia 71% 79% 76% 76% 
Lithuania 64% 71% 61% 57% 
Malta 45% 46% 74% 66% 
Poland 79% 82% 73% 70% 
Portugal - - - - 
Romania 72% 74% 72% 66% 
Slovakia 86% 90% 75% 73% 
Slovenia 77% 79% 78% 81% 
Average 71% 74% 72% 68% 
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Table 4.6 - HOS mechanism 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
The model exhibits a high value for the adjusted R-squared, of over 80%, which 
indicates a high goodness-of-fit of our model. Also, the very low probability value 
attached to the F-statistic confirms that the estimated relation between our independent 
and depend variables is, overall, significant. 
As mentioned in the previous sections, from our inspection, lagged variables deliver 
more significance than non-lagged variables, suggesting that the effect of these 
variables on inequality happens with some delay. This is why we used lagged 
explanatory variables in this, and most, regressions. 
We did not use the Trade Union Density control variable because it exhibits a 
correlation of over 60% with the lnGDP variable in the case of the “North” sample (see 
Table C.3 in Annex C). This correlation does not exist in the “South” sample but we 
decided to preserve the same regressors in both samples. 
 “North” “South” 
Trade Openness (-1) ** 0.006675 (2.136902) 
0.005796 
(1.128539) 
Rate of Secondary Education 
Completion (-1) 
** 0.024144 
(2.098978) 
* -0.070628 
(-2.726026) 
lnGDP (-1) 
-0.003748 
(-0.831207) 
-0.007056 
(-0.962291) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000345 (3.715705) 
-9.66E-05 
(-0.450457) 
KOF C (-1) ** 0.019274 (2.121034) 
5.71E-05 
(0.412475) 
No. of Countries 12 15 
No. of Observations 141 134 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844348 0.865888 
F-statistic 48.46517 46.19535 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
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We find that trade is only statistically significant in the “North” sample. In this case, it 
is significant at 5%. It exhibits a positive coefficient, consistent with the expected 
results of Hecksher-Ohlin theory, at least concerning higher-income countries. 
However, Trade Openness is not statistically different from zero for the “South” 
sample. Thus, trade does not affect negatively inequality in the “South” countries, as 
predicted by the HOS theorem. 
Moreover, we applied the same model to the whole sample, including a dummy variable 
to differentiate between “North” and “South” countries (D = 1 if “South” country). 
Regression is run including both X and X*D as regressors. The results are shown in 
Table 4.7:  
 
Table 4.7 - HOS mechanism (with dummy variable) 
 
 Both samples “South” (additional effect) 
Trade Openness (-1) ** 0.007781 (2.119852) 
-0.001985 
(-0.334770) 
Rate of Secondary Education 
Completion (-1) 
*** 0.022134 
(1.787853) 
* -0.092761 
-3.253050 
lnGDP (-1) 
0.006554 
(1.315597) 
-0.013610 
(-1.544288) 
KOF B (-1) -7.27E-05 (-0.648666) 
-2.38E-05 
(-0.099204) 
KOF C (-1) * -0.000523 (-2.737605) 
* 0.000580 
(2.465792) 
No. of Countries 27 
No. of Observations 275 
Adjusted R-squared 0.905451 
F-statistic 73.88763 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
The results of the regression presented in Table 4.7 generally confirm those of Table 4.6 
for the “North” sample. For the entire sample, Trade Openness is statistically 
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significant and has a positive coefficient, lending support to HOS theorem. “South” (for 
which D=1) does not exhibit significant different results from average. This helps make 
our understanding more complete, as it suggests that the variables interact in the same 
way for the “South” sample, i.e., that trade would also have a positive coefficient also in 
this case.  
 
4.3. Testing the FH mechanism 
Table 4.8 shows the estimation testing for the validity of the FH mechanism, using two 
separate samples: “North” and “South”. Given data availability, the time-horizon covers 
now from 1971 to 2007. 
 
Table 4.8 - FH Mechanism 
 “North” “South” 
FDI Inflows (-1) *** -0.004518 (-1.688980) 
0.001011 
(0.077812) 
FDI Outflows (-1) 0.001709 (0.363017) 
* -0.142045 
(-2.735529) 
Union Density (-1) -0.002721 (-1.138774) 
** -0.023186  
(-2.358218) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.003047 (2.062695) 
** 0.000270 
(2.307672) 
KOF C (-1) * 0.005395 (2.398646) 
0.000144 
(1.308143) 
No. of Countries 13 13 
No. of Observations 363 146 
Adjusted R-squared 0.868778 0.799528 
F-statistic 141.9818 35.01727 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
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Both regressions exhibit a high value of adjusted R-squared (over 80% for the “North” 
sample and almost 80% for “South”), indicating a high goodness-of-fit for our model. 
The p-value of the F-statistic is 0 in both cases, which tells us that the regression is 
significant overall. 
In this case, we used the Union Density control variable and therefore could not use 
lnGDP because they exhibit high correlation in the “North” sample see (Table C.3 in 
Annex C) and the use of the former produces a better overall adjustment. We did not 
use the Rate of Secondary Completion as the regression works better without it, i.e., 
there is an improvement in the significance of the relevant independent variables 
without it. 
In order to test the Feenstra-Hanson mechanism, we used both the inflows and outflows 
of Foreign Direct Investment, as detailed previously. In the “North” sample, only the 
FDI Inflows are statistically significant: FDI Inflows have a negative coefficient 
meaning that they reduce wage inequality. Our result of the impacts of FDI on 
inequality in developed countries does not confirm the predicted by the theory since it 
assumes the “North” countries will be the ones investing; i.e., theory predicts, instead, 
that FDI Outflows will (negatively) affect wage inequality. According to our results, 
FDI outflows in the “North” countries have no impact on inequality.  
As for the “South” sample, the results are symmetrical. FDI Inflows are non-significant 
while FDI Outflows are highly significant (1%) and exhibit a negative coefficient: 
when the level of FDI Outflows rises, wage inequality decreases. 
These results are tricky because they are not aligned with the theory: the FH mechanism 
predicts a positive coefficient for FDI Outflows in developed countries and a negative 
coefficient for FDI Inflows in developing countries. All we can say is that Foreign 
Direct Investment does have an effect on within-country inequality in the European 
Union, even though we cannot conclude for the relations predicted by the FH theorem. 
Nevertheless, the study by Figini and Görg (2011) exhibits results similar to ours: they 
also found that growing inward FDI contributed to lower wage inequality in developed 
countries. 
Similarly, as with the HOS mechanism, we test the FH mechanism using the whole 
sample, but also including as regressors the product of a dummy variable (=1 for the 
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“South” countries) with the original variables. In this case, both lnGDP and Trade 
Union Density can be used as regressors since correlation is low (see Table C.5 in 
Annex C). The results are detailed in Table 4.9: 
 
Table 4.9 - FH Mechanism (with dummy variable) 
 Both samples “South” (additional effect) 
FDI Inflows (-1) -0.003160 (-1.474722) 
0.004330 
(0.352639) 
FDI Outflows (-1) *** 0.009924 (1.903848) 
* -0.122637 
(-2.632643) 
lnGDP (-1) 
* -0.008509 
(-4.985451) 
0.003240 
(0.355762) 
Union Density (-1) -0.003192 (-1.506506) 
** -0.030059 
(-2.245729) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000140 (5.978497) 
 -2.90E-05 
(-0.216369) 
KOF C (-1) ** 0.000118 (2.577466) 
0.000112 
(0.792496) 
No. of Countries 26 
No. of Observations 503 
Adjusted R-squared 0.884936 
F-statistic 105.3457 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
The regression displays a high level of adjusted R-squared, at almost 90%, and its F-
statistic probability equals zero: our model has a high goodness-of-fit and the regression 
is significant.  
The results of the regression including the “South” dummy are not entirely concordant 
with our previous results, in what concerns the “North” sample since FDI inflows are 
shown not to be statistically significant.  
 43 
FDI outflows, on the other hand, are statistically significant on average and have a 
positive coefficient (in accordance to FH theory for developed countries), but are shown 
to have a negative coefficient for the “South” sample: they contradict their overall effect 
on the sample and lower inequality in the “South”; the latter results lend robustness to 
those shown in Table 4.8, above, for the “South” sample. 
4.4. Testing the SBTC mechanism 
In Table 4.10 we report the results for the test of the SBTC mechanism using the two 
separate samples and considering the share of High Tech Exports on overall 
manufactures exports as the relevant explanatory variable. Period data refers to 1993-
2007. 
 
Table 4.10 - SBTC Mechanism 
 “North” “South” 
High Tech Exports *** -0.015942 (-1.769203) 
-0.017073 
(-1.641096 ) 
lnGDP (-1) 
*** -0.006347  
(-1.666036 ) 
-0.004586 
(-0.679597) 
Rate of Secondary Completion (-1) ** 0.024587 (2.082222 ) 
* -0.073174 
(-2.924495) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000464 (4.716347 ) 
-8.69E-05 
(-0.412935) 
KOF C (-1) * 0.000226 (3.331300 ) 
7.39E-05 
(0.519641) 
No. of Countries 12 15 
No. of Observations 137 134 
Adjusted R-squared 0.852245 0.866380 
F-statistic 50.02764 46.38747 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
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Overall, the regression is statistically significant, with a high adjusted R-squared, of 
over 85%. This indicates a high goodness-of-fit of our model, as has been the case for 
our regressions thus far. Equally, the probability of the F-statistic is zero, indicating a 
significant relation between our dependent variable and all independent variables. 
The percentage of High Tech Exports over GDP is statistically significant in the 
“North”, exhibiting a negative coefficient. Therefore, in the “North”, technological 
change seems to have a negative effect on inequality, suggesting that, perhaps in this 
case, it does not work, as the theory states, skill-biased. Could it be that a higher level of 
investment in high-tech industries is benefitting the lower-skilled, lower-wage workers 
as much as, or indeed more than, highly-skilled workers? 
In order to achieve a more robust result, we estimated, as before, the same equation 
using the whole sample and including, additionally, the cross products of a dummy 
(D=1 for the “South” countries) with all the remaining regressors. Results are presented 
below in table 4.11: 
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Table 4.11 - SBTC mechanism (with dummy variable) 
 Both samples “South” (additional effect) 
High Tech Exports -0.007352 (-0.785818) 
-0.009721 
(-0.697635) 
lnGDP (-1) 
0.004990 
(0.971211) 
-0.009576 
(-1.134376) 
Rate of Secondary Completion (-1) *** 0.024739 ( 1.812170) 
* -0.097913 
(-3.454852) 
KOF B (-1) 3.28E-05 (0.273902) 
-0.000120 
(-0.497133) 
KOF C (-1) *** -0.000419 (-1.958056) 
*** 0.000493 
(1.922991) 
No. of Countries 27 
No. of Observations 271 
Adjusted R-squared 0.905064 
F-statistic 72.50038 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
The results in this regression do not show the variable High Tech Exports to be 
statistically significant for the average sample; this may be because of the non-
significance in the “South” sample found in the previous table. 
In Table 4.12, we test the SBTC mechanism using an alternative variable for 
technology-enhanced production: the gross expenditure on research and development 
(GERD). Time horizon covers 1982-2007. 
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Table 4.12 - SBTC mechanism (GERD) 
 “North” “South” 
Gross Expenditure on Research 
and Development (-1) 
***0.000698 
(1.679838) 
0.000142 
(0.031117) 
lnGDP *-0.008371 (-5.071339) 
0.002890 
(0.416872) 
KOF B (-1) *0.000199 (5.961419) 
-8.52E-05 
(-0.365294) 
KOF C (-1) *4.90E-05 (1.716381) 
0.000190 
(1.407856) 
No. of Countries 13 15 
No. of Observations 267 142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.849686 0.841544 
F-statistic 94.97688 42.60205 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
As before, the model exhibits a good adjustment with the regressors being statistically 
significant as a whole.  
We did not use the Rate of Secondary Education Completion as it exhibits a high 
correlation with our explanatory variable in the “North” (-0.75 in Table C.3 in Annex 
C). lnGDP worked better in this particular regression, which is why we used it. 
GERD is significant only for the “North” (at 10% confidence). It exhibits a positive 
coefficient, meaning that a higher level of gross expenditure on research and 
development makes wage inequality to rise in these countries. This is in accordance to 
the theory, which says that technological progress is skill-biased and will therefore 
create higher demand for skilled workers, raising the skill wage-premium. 
For the “South” sample, our results show that technology appears to be neutral for the 
relative demand of skilled vs. unskilled workers. 
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As with the previous regressions, we assess the effect of GERD in wage inequality 
considering the whole sample, with a dummy identifying the “South” countries. We 
show the results in table 4.13 
 
Table 4.13 - SBTC mechanism (GERD) (with dummy variable) 
 Both samples “South” (additional effect) 
Gross Expenditure on Research 
and Development (-1) 
0.000359 
(0.851697) 
-0.000218 
(-0.048772) 
lnGDP * -0.008527 (-5.772888) 
*** 0.011417 
(1.650851) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000178 (6.072852) 
-0.000263 
(-1.148240) 
KOF C (-1) ** 0.000113 (2.062490) 
7.70E-05 
(0.540493) 
No. of Countries 28 
No. of Observations 409 
Adjusted R-squared 0.905882 
F-statistic 113.1991 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
Using this method, the GERD variable does not appear to be significant, possibly 
because of non-significance for the “South” sample as recorded before. 
4.5. Testing all mechanisms 
In order to achieve more robust results, we also test all mechanisms using the same 
regression. We tested both samples separately, as well as together with a dummy 
variable, and used both High Tech Exports and GERD as SBTC relevant variables. We 
present the results in tables 4.14 through 4.17. 
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Table 4.14 - All Effects (with High Tech Exports) 
 “North” “South” 
Trade Openness (-1) 
0.000113 
(0.044303) 
* 0.022746 
(4.037305) 
FDI Inflows (-1) *** -0.006685 (-1.957685) 
0.007885 
(0.703472) 
FDI Outflows (-1) -0.002998 (-0.606800) 
* -0.129298 
(-2.643481) 
High Tech Exports (-1) *** 0.010906 (1.859956) 
0.004778 
(0.219671) 
LnGDP (-1) * -0.011119 (-6.750797) 
*** -0.010055 
(-2.355079) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000219 (3.708790) 
** 0.000211 
(1.974399) 
KOF C (-1) * 7.15E-05 (1.837760) 
* 0.000254 
(3.417030) 
No. of Countries 13 15 
No. of Observations 188 200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.926365 0.794808 
F-statistic 124.8184 37.70593 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
These regressions also exhibit high adjusted R-squared values, as well as very low F-
statistic probabilities, indicating that the regressions, thus the relation between the 
variables, are significant. 
Generally, the results confirm the results we got from the previous regressions. 
However, Trade Openness is not found to be significant in this regression for the 
“North” sample, but it is significant for the “South” sample with a positive coefficient. 
From our previous results, the one closest to this one is in table 4.7 (in the dummy 
variable regression) where trade is statistically significant for both samples and a 
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different result is not found for the South sample, indicating that, for “South”, it should 
also have a positive coefficient.  
The FDI results confirm what we found in both previous regressions as well: FDI 
inflows are found to be significantly negative for the “North” sample, while FDI 
outflows are significant and have a negative coefficient in the “South” sample. 
The results for High Tech Exports, however, are not in line with the previous results. 
Here, for the “North” sample, the variable displays a positive coefficient, unlike in the 
regressions in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. In the “South,” the variable is found to be non-
significant. 
 
Table 4.15 - All Effects (with GERD) 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 “North” “South” 
Trade Openness (-1) 
** 0.003775 
( 2.135412) 
*** 0.012064 
(1.910978) 
FDI Inflows (-1) * -0.006780 (-2.909496) 
-0.002510 
(-0.198470) 
FDI Outflows (-1) 0.000808 (0.172516) 
*** -0.076907 
(-1.977) 
GERD (-1) ** 0.000948 (2.532222) 
0.002328 
(-0.351086) 
lnGDP (-1) * -0.008875 (-4.678346) 
** -0.004898 
(-0.627158) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000197 (5.359720) 
3.29E-05 
(0.145752) 
KOF C (-1) 4.35E-05 (1.405201) 
* 0.000253 
(1.784780) 
No. of Countries 13 15 
No. of Observations 251 142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881785 0.846346 
F-statistic 99.14698 37.98306 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
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The regressions exhibit a high adjusted R-squared as well as a low F-statistic 
probability: the regression is significant. 
Trade is found significant and with a positive coefficient for both samples, once again 
unlike our previous results, in which it was found significant for the “North” sample. 
The results for FDI are also consistent with all the results we had so far. GERD displays 
a positive coefficient for the “North” sample and is not significant in the “South”, 
confirming our results in the first GERD regressions (Table 4.9). 
We did not use Secondary Education Completion Rate as it was too correlated with the 
GERD variable. We did not use it above so as to make the results comparable. 
 
Table 4.16 – All Effects (with dummy variable and High Tech Exports) 
 Both samples “South” (additional effects) 
Trade Openness (-1) 
4.83E-05 
(0.017317) 
* 0.022697 
(3.613757) 
FDI Inflows (-1) *** -0.006865 (-1.908423) 
0.014750 
(1.254141) 
FDI Outflows (-1) -0.003383 (-0.655372) 
** -0.125915 
(-2.562601) 
High Tech Exports (-1) * 0.019793 (3.016435) 
-0.015015 
(-0.661570) 
lnGDP(-1) * -0.008602 (-5.179191) 
-0.001453 
(-0.233432) 
KOF B (-1) ** 0.000107 (2.327411) 
0.000103 
(0.887926) 
KOF C (-1) 1.05E-05 (0.249673) 
* 0.000244 
(2.857428) 
No. of Countries 28 
No. of Observations 388 
Adjusted R-squared 0.867902 
F-statistic 63.01543 
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Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
Table 4.17 – All Effects (with dummy variable and GERD) 
 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
In both the tables above, we find confirmation for some of our previous results, though 
not all. Trade Openness has a positive estimated coefficient confirming HOS for 
developed countries on average; however this result seems to hold only when GERD is 
taken as relevant SBTC variable. When High Tech Exports is used, it is found to be 
significant and positive for the “South” sample. 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 Both samples “South” (additional effects) 
Trade Openness (-1) ** 0.003900 (1.963572) 
0.008164 
(1.264911) 
FDI Inflows (-1) ** -0.005548 (-2.339149) 
0.003037 
(0.242441) 
FDI Outflows (-1) 0.004882 (0.895033) 
** -0.081789 
(-2.139481) 
Gross Expenditure in Research 
in Development (-1) 
0.000365 
(0.776259) 
0.001963 
(0.435774) 
lnGDP(-1) * -0.008233 (-4.112575) 
0.003335 
(0.424444) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000156 (4.468251) 
-0.000123 
(-0.550993) 
KOF C (-1) *** 9.81E-05 (1.657911) 
0.000155 
(1.034017) 
No. of Countries 28 
No. of Observations 393 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911820 
F-statistic 99.86468 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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We conjecture that the use, in the same regression, of both Trade Openness and High 
Tech Exports may make the latter capture the effects of the former. FDI inflows have a 
negative coefficient for the “North”, while FDI Outflows have a negative coefficient for 
the “South”. Technological variables seem to have little impact; the non-significance of 
GERD in the “South” may affect both sample average as non-significant as well. 
 
Table 4.18 – All Effects (with KOF Index) 
 “North” “South” 
KOF A (-1) 3.54E-05 (1.294480) 
* 0.000278 
(2.914902) 
High Tech Exports (-1) -0.002728 (-0.466614) 
0.024571 
(1.143560) 
lnGDP(-1) * -0.011546 (-5.981325) 
** -0.013864 
(-2.567748) 
KOF B (-1) * 0.000238 (3.392314) 
7.66E-05 
(0.655486) 
KOF C (-1) 6.59E-05 (1.606805) 
* 0.000262 
(3.175404) 
No. of Countries 13 15 
No. of Observations 195 200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.867191 0.787150 
F-statistic 75.51412 39.73315 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
We also tried a regression in which we tested all mechanisms but did so by using the 
economic aspects of the KOF globalization index as a stand-in for the trade and FDI 
variables (KOF A, as explained in chapter 2 and Annex B.1,) simply in order to 
determine whether Trade or FDI flows weigh more in the final result in affecting wage 
inequality: since trade has had a positive coefficient in all our regressions and FDI flows 
hold negative coefficients for the samples for which they are significant (FDI inflows 
for the “North” sample and FDI outflows for the “South” sample), it would seem to 
follow that, if KOF A had a positive coefficient, the effect of trade is stronger in the 
final result and, if it had a negative coefficient, it is FDI the one with the most 
pronounced influence in inequality. 
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As we can see in Table 4.18 above, KOF A is found to be non-significant for the 
“North” sample, but it exhibits a positive value for the “South” sample, indicating trade 
has a stronger effect on inequality in these countries. 
The values for adjusted R-squared are above 80% and the probability of the F-statistic 
still equals zero for this regression, as in the previous ones. 
Table 4.19 – All Effects (with dummy variable and KOF index) 
Notes: (1) Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
(2) Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
Making the same test with a dummy variable gives us a similar result: KOF A is shown 
to have a positive coefficient, indicating trade weighs more on the final result and that 
the economic aspects of globalization (in this case, the increased flows of trade, FDI, 
etc.) have the effect of increasing inequality. This is the result for both samples on 
average and, possibly because of the “South” influence (in the previous regression, 
KOF A increases wage inequality in the “South” sample). Trade influences inequality 
more than FDI does, which means that, overall, the economic aspects of globalization 
have the effect of raising wage inequality. 
 Both samples “South” (additional effects) 
KOF A (-1) 
* 0.000157 
( 3.670239) 
-8.58E-05 
(-1.323063) 
High Tech Exports (-1) -0.009524 ( -1.232299) 
0.014866 
(1.565883) 
lnGDP(-1) * -0.001997 (-2.908064) 
* 0.002414 
(3.050070) 
KOF B (-1) 0.000111 (1.045243) 
* -0.000448 
(-3.412042) 
KOF C (-1) -8.67E-05 (0.754758) 
* 0.000371 
(4.449285) 
No. of Countries 28 
No. of Observations 395 
Adjusted R-squared 0.486500 
F-statistic 38.32838 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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4.6 Other aspects of globalization 
The other aspects of globalization, political and social, consistently exhibit a positive 
coefficient for both samples in nearly every regression (there are few exceptions for the 
political aspects in the “South” sample), implying that even the aspects of globalization 
which are not directly related to the economy or economic performance have the effect 
of causing inequality to rise. 
This result is more robust for the “North” sample, however, as often for the “South” the 
variables are non-significant.  
However, we do not think these aspects are ever independent of the economic 
component (the spread of the McDonald’s chain, for example, a staple of our globalized 
world, is an economic flow first – the company seeks profit, and social second – it leads 
to a world where there are certain things we all have in common,) so we need to be 
cautious to read them as separate when inequality is concerned.  
 
4.7 Control variables across estimations 
The control variables behave largely as expected and exhibit consistent results. The 
level of lnGDP per capita clearly has a negative coefficient, meaning that, as GDP per 
capita rises, inequality falls. Richer countries, then, should have lower inequality than 
poorer countries. 
The rate of completion of secondary education is found to be significant for the “North” 
sample but, unlike we expected, its coefficient, when significant, is positive. It seems 
then that the higher this rate, the higher inequality. Does this mean that, as more and 
more people achieve relatively higher education levels, they leave those who have not 
achieved it further behind? The fact that the results for the “South” sample are opposite 
(when significant, the coefficient is negative) seems to indicate the level of education 
has different impacts in these two sets of countries: in the “South”, higher education 
may still lead to lower inequality. We tried regressions with the rate of higher secondary 
and tertiary completion but they led much to the same results. 
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Union density, which we ended up being unable to use in most regressions, was found 
to be significant and to display, as expected, a negative coefficient, since unions give 
workers bargaining power and tend to fight for higher salaries, especially for the low-
skilled workers. 
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5. Conclusions 
At the onset of this study, we started with several goals in mind. Relying on the relevant 
literature, our general idea was that globalization had an effect on within-country wage 
inequality. Our first step then was to review the existing literature, in order to first 
clarify the main definitions, namely those of globalization and inequality, and then to 
understand how the various facets of the former may affect the latter.  
We found that the mechanisms through which globalization act are manifold, from 
International Trade, to FDI and Technological Change (although this last one is only 
indirectly connected to the growing openness of countries to one another, technological 
change is highly augmented through globalization, as people from different countries 
can share their new technologies and contribute to each other’s research). Additionally, 
international pressure to create, e.g., uniform labor laws, among other common 
institutional frameworks, may also have an effect on within-country inequality. The 
mechanisms through which these different facets act are also varied and complex. Our 
first conclusion was, then, that there is not one single effect of globalization on 
inequality: there are many, and they do not all work in the same direction. For example, 
according to the literature, growing international trade is found to have the consequence 
of decreasing inequality in developing countries whereas it increases inequality in the 
developed ones (referred to in the literature as Heckscher–Ohlin-Samuelson theorem, 
HOS). However, growing inflows (outflows) of FDI are expected to increase inequality 
in developing (developed) countries according to the Feenstra-Hanson theorem (FH).  
As such, we reviewed studies in which these theories had been submitted to empirical 
tests, in order assess if data supports them. As so often happens in economic literature, 
not all empirical results point in the same direction. Regarding many mechanisms 
(namely the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem), there have been positive and 
negative results regarding its support, and indeed the negative results have, in some 
cases, led to the reinterpretation of the theory instead of leading economists to discard it 
altogether. It is difficult then to conclude, on literature review alone, whether these 
theories hold. In particular, these mechanisms are bound to work differently depending 
on which country (or set of countries) we try to apply them to. 
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Therefore, we decided to test them ourselves. We decided to assess how these 
mechanisms affect a reality close to us – the European Union (EU) countries, covering 
annual data from 1970 to 2007. This set of countries has hardly been study in the 
literature testing for these mechanisms and, even though it encloses developed 
countries, there are striking differences between them in what regards their stage of 
development. Therefore, we divided the member-states of the European Union into two 
groups, one which would best capture the “North” as it is defined in economic 
literature, as the group of countries which are richer and have a larger supply of higher-
skilled labor (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), and the other group 
representing the “South” (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
We chose the Theil Index of Industrial Pay Inequality as our dependent variable because 
we wanted to isolate the effect of these mechanisms on wages and not study how they 
interact with overall disposable income. In fact, the theories at stake draw implications 
on wage premium and not on disposable income inequality. Moreover, wages are a very 
relevant source of income for the vast majority of people. 
Regarding the international trade mechanism, our results support, for the overall sample 
of the EU countries, the HOS theorem. Results appear to be rather robust for the 
“North” sample, whereas the effects for the “South” are rather weak: indeed, we did not 
find a negative relation between trade and inequality, but trade openness is not 
significant in affecting inequality in most of our regressions. 
Results on the FDI are the most robust across regressions. Feenstra and Hanson predict 
the effect of FDI on inequality but they rely on the assumption that Northern countries 
will be solely the sources of FDI while the Southern countries act solely as FDI 
receivers; therefore their theory only applies to how developed countries react to 
growing FDI outflows and how developing countries react to growing FDI inflows. 
Even if, when we consider the entire sample, FH results hold (FDI outflows increase 
wage inequality), most of our results show that FDI flows tend to reduce inequality in 
both set of countries: FDI outflows are found to reduce inequality in the “South” 
countries whereas FDI inflows reduce wage inequality in the most developed EU 
countries.  
 58 
We also tested the SBTC mechanism to assess how technology, usually boosted by 
globalization, affects wage inequality. Relying on two variables, the share of high 
technology exports on total exports and the gross expenditure on research and 
development (GERD), we conclude that whereas results are mixed in the “North” 
countries for the former variable, the latter consistently contributes to increasing 
inequality in the most developed countries. We conjecture that when technology is more 
mature and is successful in improving competitiveness (as increasing exports) it might 
benefit wage distribution; however, in the early stages of technology development (as 
measured by GERD), we find evidence for skill-based technology change in the 
“North” countries, meaning that a higher technological level increases inequality in this 
case. 
When replacing the economic characteristics of globalization (ie. trade and FDI) with a 
composite index such as the KOF economic component, we conclude that it increases 
wage inequality on average and thus we may conjecture that the effect of trade 
dominates in affecting inequality relatively to those attached to FDI flows. 
Moreover, testing for other non-economic aspects of globalization, as captured by the 
KOF index, we found rather robust results showing that globalization, at both political 
and social levels, causes wage inequality to increase. 
 
Our conclusions relying on EU data confirm that the relation between globalization and 
wage inequality is not straightforward. Some aspects of it lead to a rising skill premium 
(like trade and technological progress) and others (foreign direct investment), instead, 
cause the skill premium to diminish.  
One limitation of this work is that we failed to fully mimic globalization flows between 
the “North” and the “South” countries of the EU. Indeed, even still most of the trade is 
of intra-EU nature, we should take into account only the bilateral trade between the 
“North” and the “South” countries and not the overall trade of a given country. This 
implies that, some of the trade is intra sub-samples or that, in trading with non-EU 
countries, some “South” countries indeed act as “North” relative to their main partners. 
The same criticism applies to FDI flows, since “South” countries are likely to receive 
inflows from the “North” but also act as investors, thus as “North”, in non-EU 
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countries. This partially justifies the impact of FDI outflows in reducing inequality in 
the “South”. 
Further refinement in data treatment in future research work is expected to make more 
clear the effective differences between the “North” and the “South” EU countries, 
lending robustness to the test of the different mechanisms operating from globalization 
to wage inequality. 
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Annex A 
 
Table A.1 – GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Luxembourg  80,39     81,44     83,89     84,26     86,70     89,87     92,81     97,41     94,98     88,06     89,15    88,85  88,15    
Ireland  39,70     41,02     42,52     43,39     44,40     46,08     47,32     48,26     46,27     42,87     42,19    42,95  43,91    
Denmark  40,70     40,84     40,90     40,95     41,78     42,68     43,99     44,49     43,88     41,17     41,56    41,83  42,06    
Netherlands  39,22     39,68     39,45     39,40     40,14     40,87     42,19     43,75     44,36     42,52     42,94    43,15  41,47    
Austria  37,72     37,90     38,35     38,50    39,25  39,92     41,18     42,54     42,96     41,18     41,79    42,89  40,35    
Belgium  36,74     36,91     37,24     37,39     38,45     38,90     39,68     40,52     40,60     39,15     39,61    39,84  38,75    
Sweden  34,91     35,26     36,02     36,72     38,13     39,18     40,63     41,67     41,09     38,69     40,88    41,76  38,75    
Germany  35,86     36,35     36,29     36,13     36,56     36,83     38,24     39,54     40,04     38,08     39,67    40,98  37,88    
Finland  32,93     33,60     34,14     34,74     36,07     36,99     38,48     40,36     40,29     36,67     37,73    38,62  36,72    
France  34,13     34,50     34,57     34,63     35,26     35,63     36,26     36,86     36,62     35,29     35,72    36,26  35,48    
Italy  34,67     35,29     35,40     35,22     35,60     35,76     36,43     36,86     36,19     34,05     34,53    34,63  35,39    
United 
Kingdom  31,42     31,98     32,58     33,71     34,58     35,45     36,16     37,11     36,54     34,39     34,69    34,80  34,45    
Spain  30,07     30,80     31,12     31,50     31,97     32,57     33,32     33,85     33,61     32,04     31,83    31,73  32,04    
Cyprus  28,78     29,62     29,87     29,92     30,47     30,91     31,57     32,70     33,50     32,66     31,91    31,23  31,09    
Greece  24,25     25,19     25,98     27,43     28,53     29,09     30,59     31,58     31,44     30,45     29,04    27,05  28,38    
Malta  26,12     24,95     25,46     25,33     25,03     25,78     26,26     27,29     28,30     27,34     27,94    28,32  26,51    
Slovenia  22,11     22,72     23,56     24,24     25,29     26,25     27,70     29,44     30,45     27,76     28,02    28,16  26,31    
Portugal  25,06     25,37     25,43     25,10     25,43     25,58     25,90     26,47     26,43     25,63     26,12    25,83  25,69    
Czech 
Republic  19,49     20,17     20,64     21,43     22,44     23,92     25,53     26,84     27,44     26,05     26,62    27,05  23,97    
Hungary  17,74     18,44     19,32     20,12     21,14     22,02     22,91     22,97     23,22     21,68     22,00    22,41  21,16    
Slovak 
Republic  15,34     15,90     16,64     17,44     18,33     19,55     21,18     23,40     24,72     23,47     24,43    25,13  20,46    
Estonia  14,32     15,32     16,42     17,81     19,05     20,86     23,10     24,95     23,98     20,63     21,21    23,31  20,08    
Croatia  15,39     15,90     16,68     17,57     18,30     19,07     20,02     21,06     21,50     20,03     19,63    20,21  18,78    
Lithuania  11,94     12,85     13,84     15,38     16,70     18,30     20,05     22,28     23,17     19,98     20,67    22,41  18,13    
Poland  14,29     14,46     14,68     15,26     16,08     16,67     17,72     18,93     19,90     20,25     21,01    21,75  17,58    
Latvia  11,52     12,61     13,58     14,70     16,15     18,06     20,45     22,68     21,94     18,30     18,62    19,97  17,38    
Romania  9,83     10,53     11,27     11,93     13,10     13,74     15,03     16,21     17,78     16,71     16,65    17,12  14,16    
Bulgaria  9,19     9,76     10,41     11,05     11,85     12,68     13,57     14,74     15,76     14,99     15,15    15,52  12,89    
 
Source: World Bank databank 
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Annex B 
 
Table B.1 – Composition of the KOF Index 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology   
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Annex C 
 
Table C.1 - Descriptive Statistics - "North" sample 
 
 
 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
No. of 
Observation
s 
Theil index 0,014222 0,013650 0,007082 0,003000 0,045000 454 
Trade 
Openness 
0,603179 0,488304 0,304747 0,176160 1,833062 465 
FDI 
Inflows 
0,024856 0,009878 0,066744 -0,550747 0,746971 440 
FDI 
Outflows 
0.028768 0.010324 0.077802 -0.042346 1.429486 445 
High Tech 
Exports 
0,181933 0,164332 0,098717 0,051073 0,478399 238 
GERD 1.799544 1.833384 0.709264 0.400864 4.129996 310 
lnGDP per 
capita 
10,27798 9,993841 0,926193 9,117460 12,69527 494 
Secondary 
Education 
Completio
n 
0,391474 0,367500 0,128256 0,213000 0,72000 190 
Trade 
Union 
Density 
0,455365 0,452231 0,209830 0,075760 0,874420 470 
KOF A 0.5975361 0.588100 0.150761 0.347000 0.925000 421 
KOF B 0.5397171 0.544200 0.1786965 0.218400 0.921900 421 
KOF C 0.6324330 0.641400 0.2008373 0.119500 0.941400 421 
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Table C.2 - Descriptive Statistics – Sample 2 (South) 
 
 
 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
No. of 
Observati
ons 
Theil 
index 
0.023166 0.021600 0.015526 0.002800 0.073700 382 
Trade 0.753967 0.721185 0.333080 0.798400 1.565062 362 
FDI 
Inflows 
0.033218 0.020401 0.042154 -0,097454 0,294167 397 
FDI 
Outflows 
0.005692 0.000598 0.012925 -0.013324 0.106411 349 
High Tech 
Exports 
0.105482 0.052037 0.141416 0.004005 0.717415 241 
GERD 0.717786 0.63358 0.312124 0.218100 1.558110 163 
lnGDP per 
capita 
9,602834 9,216693 1,815076 7,150529 14,63861 403 
Secondary 
Completio
n 
0,366057 0,302500 0,188705 0,162000 0,807000 158 
Trade 
Union 
Density 
0,415097 0,360735 0,229374 0,000000 1,000000 196 
KOF A 0.711683 0.721950 0.166651 0.406900 0.991600 494 
KOF B 0.689790 0.727250 0.147933 0.334800 0.918000 494 
KOF C 0.860922 0.923050 0.129834 0.453400 0.982600 494 
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Table C.3 - Correlation between Variables (“North”) 
 
 
  
 
Trade 
Openness 
(-1) 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1) 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1) 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
High 
Tech 
Exports  
(-1) 
GERD 
(-1) lnGDP 
lnGDP 
(-1) 
Secondar
y 
Educatio
n 
Completi
on 
(-1) 
Union 
Density 
(-1) 
KOF A 
(-1) 
KOF B 
(-1) 
KOF C 
(-1) 
Trade 
Openness 
(-1) 
1 0.53101 0.27895 0.28249 0.31007 0.01490 0.08307 0.07846 -0.15500 0.17274 0.01197 0.184473 0.28489 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1) 
 1 0.33725 -0.00853 0.01862 0.01559 0.09646 0.09466 -0.02050 0.09666 0.23748 0.09790 0.04098 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1) 
  1 0.22413 0.25219 0.10816 0.10758 0.10587 -0.14308 -0.04456 0.23748 -0.03811 -0.00604 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
   1 0.97226 0.10001 0.00949 -0.00050 -0.17949 0.07044 0.17895 -0.12493 0.41831 
High 
Tech 
Exports  
(-1) 
    1 0.09544 0.01528 0.00591 -0.19583 0.04543 -0.42039 -0.08414 0.42178 
GERD 
(-1)      1 0.46794 0.46791 -0.75111 0.51098 -0.39945 0.21839 0.31258 
lnGDP       1 0.99978 -0.507600 0.67015 0.18607 0.12817 0.04237 
lnGDP  
(-1)        1 -0.50897 0.66549 -0.21062 0.12814 0.04144 
Secondary 
Education 
Completion 
(-1) 
        1 -0.38190 -0.20893 -0.22909 -0.36822 
Union 
Density(-1)          1 0.00626 0.29045 0.21010 
KOF A (-1)           
1 
1 -0.40194 
KOF B 
(-1)           
 
1 0.24988 
KOF C 
(-1)           
 
 1 
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Table C.4 - Correlation between Variables (South) 
 
 
  
 
Trade 
Openness 
(-1) 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1) 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1) 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
High 
Tech 
Exports  
(-1) 
GERD 
(-1) lnGDP 
lnGDP 
(-1) 
Secondary 
Education 
Completion 
(-1) 
Union 
Density 
(-1) 
KOF A 
(-1) 
KOF B 
(-1) 
KOF C 
(-1) 
Trade 
Openness 
(-1) 
1 0.27623 -0.1201 0.39562 0.43515 0.33863 0.32082 0.31530 -0.39776 -0.21287 
0.47865 
0.15222 -0.2199 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1) 
 1 0.17682 0.21504 0.22970 -0.22852 -0.04662 
-
0.04863 -0.1184 0.07469 
0.22765 
0.02393 -0.13088 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1) 
  1 0.20513 0.19504 -0.13341 -0.02243 
-
0.01869 0.426001 0.13401 
0.35499 
0.17225 -0.05093 
High 
Tech Exports    1 0.98545 -0.11564 0.32138 0.32468 0.347812 0.33993 
-
0.53012
1 0.31167 -0.36941 
High 
Tech Exports 
(-1) 
    1 -0.10509 0.30185 0.30477 0.34305 0.30492 
-
0.52867 
0.29948 -0.36714 
GERD (-1)      1 0.37881 0.37842 -0.26861 -0.12193 
0.04198 
0.27169 0.14548 
lnGDP       1 0.99988 -0.16400 -0.22347 
-
0.29459 
0.51223 0.40764 
lnGDP  (-1)        1 -0.15600 -0.21685 
-
0.29342 0.51494 0.40795 
Secondary 
Education 
Completion 
(-1) 
        1 0.26675 0.23176 -0.03408 0.0019 
Union 
Density(-1)          1 
-
0.15239 
-
0.02445 -0.55140 
KOF A (-1)           1 0.48781 -0.13325 
KOF B 
(-1)            1 0.02651 
KOF C 
(-1)             1 
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Table C.5 - Correlation between Variables (Both Samples) 
 
 
Trade 
Opennes
s 
(-1) 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1) 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1) 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
High 
Tech 
Exports 
(-1) 
GERD 
(-1) lnGDP 
lnGDP 
(-1) 
Secondary 
Education 
Completion 
(-1) 
Union 
Density 
(-1) 
KOF A 
(-1) 
KOF B 
(-1)) 
KOF C 
(-1) 
Trade 
Openness 
(-1) 
1 0.46921 0.07812 0.20316 0.22720 -0.14582 0.14911 0.14264 -0.26911 0.00121 0.54777 0.05476 -0.32968 
FDI 
Inflows 
(-1)  
1 0.26353 0.02934 0.04929 -0.06679 0.02040 0.01817 -0.05783 0.06934 0.31301 0.06461 -0.20047 
FDI 
Outflows 
(-1)   
1 0.28162 0.29979 0.30202 0.07867 0.08110 0.03822 0.06943 0.40939 0.37695 0.09689 
High Tech 
Exports    1 0.98065 0.23216 0.21473 0.21523 0.12615 0.21216 0.47324 0.27245 -0.03785 
High Tech 
Exports 
(-1)     
1 0.23891 0.20715 0.20776 0.11910 0.19029 0.48539 0.28695 -0.02993 
GERD 
(-1)      1 0.30870 0.31282 -0.31964 0.46785 0.22648 0.59370 0.42416 
lnGDP       1 0.99983 -0.26378 0.24147 0.31841 0.38249 0.29345 
lnGDP 
(-1)        1 -0.25791 0.24272 0.31647 0.38811 0.29846 
Secondary 
Education 
Completio
n 
(-1) 
        1 -0.10673 0.03331 -0.23674 0.06645 
Union 
Density 
(-1)          
1 0.29785 0.15857 -0.06483 
KOF A 
(-1)           1 0.48034 0.00595 
KOF B 
(-1)            1 0.36551 
KOF C 
(-1)             1 
